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THE UNITED STATES, FAO AND WORLD FOOD POLITICS: U.S. RELATIONS WITH AN INTERNATIONAL FOOD ORGANIZATION

A STAFF REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NUTRITION
AND HUMAN NEEDS
UNITED STATES SENATE

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PREFACE

I asked the minority staff of the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs to prepare this study of United States participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations for two reasons.

First, as the world's largest agricultural producer, the United States should play a more active role in combating worldwide hunger and malnutrition. Second, the United States can make a significant contribution through international organizations active in the food field.

The findings of the staff study will trouble those who are optimistic about developing and executing a worldwide strategy to insure an adequate diet for all as well as all who hope to see the United States contribute efficiently and effectively to this endeavor through multilateral channels.

—The United States does not have a clear view of FAO's primary function or future directions, much less an overall strategy that assigns a specific role to each of the 88 intergovernmental organizations which together with FAO seek to improve world food, agriculture and nutrition.

—U.S. policy toward FAO and general food policy is mady by more than a score of government agencies.

—U.S. policy positions, devised through an informal interagency bargaining process, are negative and reactive rather than positive and creative.

—No agency has final authority and responsibility for making and implementing U.S. policy toward FAO.

The most disturbing finding of this study is that international antihunger efforts are fragmented among 89 international intergovernmental organizations. Proliferation of organizations continues unchecked and policymaking remains uncoordinated.

Government officials and private individuals alike have accepted the view that it is better to have more rather than fewer organizations because some are likely to be effective. This can be a costly approach to international policymaking.

Because no U.S. official knows how much the United States spends on bilateral and multilateral food, agriculture and nutrition programs and activities, I asked the staff to estimate the figure.

If direct aid expenditures are added to U.S. contributions to international organizations (including lending institutions such as the World Bank group), and if administrative expenses associated with both bilateral and multilateral activities are included, the United States spends about $3 billion a year on international food and nutrition activities.

These resources, spent in a haphazard and uncoordinated way would appear to some to contribute more to the growth of an international bureaucracy than to the elimination of world hunger.

The point is not that more or less should be invested in this field; the point is that expenditures should be decided on the basis of a rational scheme which assigns to each international organization and to our bilateral programs specific yet mutually-complementary functions in the world wide anti-hunger effort.

If some organizations duplicate the work of others or if some are less effective than others, the United States should take the lead in suggesting the elimination of some and the restructuring of others. This will not happen until one agency in the executive branch is assigned responsibility for all U.S. activities in this field.

Congress has not exercised sufficient oversight of U.S. participation in international organizations generally and FAO in particular. Not once in 30 years has any congressional committee taken more than a passing look at FAO and U.S. policy toward it. One reason for this lack of oversight is that several committees have a legitimate interest in various aspects of U.S.–FAO relations.

I asked the staff of the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs to prepare this study as part of the committee's effort to devise recommendations for a national nutrition policy. A select committee is designed and equipped to examine issues which cut across the jurisdictions of several standing committees.

If the United States wants to make the best use of FAO and thereby make an effective contribution to international food policy, three changes must occur.

First, management of U.S. participation in FAO and development of U.S. policy toward FAO should be changed to reflect the organization's evolving mission, the growth of its resources and the continuation of the world food crisis.

The staff has made several suggestions about organizational change. These suggestions should be considered by the Senate Government Operations Committee, which is now examining U.S. participation in all international organizations. The conclusions and recommendations derived from the Select Committee's project point to the problems that I, as ranking minority member of the Government Operations Committee, intend to ask that committee to pursue.

Second, a more creative and coherent U.S. policy toward FAO should be developed and implemented. This policy should consist of clear-cut goals, objectives and priorities, and should specify steps that the United States intends to take in order to achieve its objectives. It should be based on the premise that FAO's major role should be to eliminate hunger and malnutrition in developing countries through increased food production.

Third, and most important, U.S. policy toward FAO should be made within the context of a larger and more inclusive worldwide antihunger strategy. U.S. policy toward FAO is now made in isolation from policy toward other organizations. The effect of U.S. participation in all organizations is therefore diminished.

I recommend this staff study to all who wish to make Government more efficient and economical, and to those who wish to see the United States pursue a vigorous policy in the war against hunger and malnutrition.

CHARLES H. PERCY,
United States Senator, June 1976.

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INTRODUCTION

This is a study of U.S. participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), one of the autonomous specialized agencies of the U.N. system. The creation of FAO was recommended by the U.N. Conference on Food and Agriculture convened by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in Hot Springs, Va., in 1943. The agency was formally established in October 1945, when its constitution was signed in Quebec, Canada. Thirty-six nations originally were members of FAO. Its membership now stands at 136 nations; the Soviet Union is not a member of the organization.

According to its constitution, the FAO has four purposes:

Raising levels of nutrition and standards of living of people under the jurisdiction of the member governments;

Securing improvements in the efficiency of production and distribution of food and agriculture products;

Bettering the condition of rural populations; and

Contributing to an expanding world economy and striving to assure freedom from hunger.

The purpose of this study is threefold: (1) To describe U.S. participation in FAO; (2) to analyze U.S. policy regarding FAO; (3) to examine how this policy is made and implemented.

The study is divided into two parts. Part I considers FAO in the context of the system of international organizations and as a unit in the food policy subsystem. Included in part I is a review of FAO's structure, finances, and programs, as well as a consideration of problems in FAO's programing and staffing. Part II examines in detail U.S. policy toward FAO, U.S. participation in the organization, and the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy toward the organization.

The study has been conducted over a 7-month period. It is based on observations of the 17th and 18th sessions of the FAO Conference and the 1974 World Food Conference, and interviews with members of the FAO and World Food Council secretariats in Rome in November 1975. Members of the U.S. delegation to the 18th session, as well as other officials of the State Department and the Department of Agriculture and observers outside of Government were interviewed. U.S. General Accounting Office reports and materials collected by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress and the Office of Technology Assessment were important sources of information.

The Office of International Organization Affairs, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture—headed by Dr. Ralph W. Phillips—and the Agriculture Directorate, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State—headed by Paul J. Byrnes—supplied materials as requested and were generally helpful in all aspects of the study.

Senator Charles S. Percy, ranking minority member of the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, chaired 3 days of oversight hearings, one in December 1975, and two in March 1976. These hearings focused on U.S. participation in FAO and in the 18th session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization held in Rome in November 1975. The hearings provided much of the data presented in this study.

Following are the conclusions and recommendations of the staff of the Select Comittee on Nutrition and Human Needs concerning U.S. participation in FAO.

Conclusions

1. The Food and Agriculture Organization is but one of 89 international governmental organizations identified by the staff which, in varying degrees have an interest in or responsibility for food, agriculture, or nutrition issues, policies, or programs. Proliferation and fragmentation of food programs may result in duplication and waste. At the very least, proliferation of bureaucracies means diverting funds from programs that directly benefit people.

2. To be effective, world and national policymakers must consider how these organizations relate to one another in the effort to create a global strategy to combat hunger and malnutrition through increased food production. This is not being done at the present time.

3. A coherent, rational and explicit policy consisting of goals, objectives, and priorities for FAO and for the United States as a member of FAO does not exist. What does exist are fragments of policy, some broad and vaguely stated, others more precise, and some generally understood by those responsible for U.S. participation in the organization but rarely articulated by them.

4. In general, the United States has supported the organization and its program of work, but only so long as it does not expand too rapidly or become too expensive. There is a consensus on these points among policymakers.

5. Aside from these generalized views, U.S. policy tends to be "situation-or-issue-specific." These policies tend to be negative and reactive rather than positive and creative.

6. U.S. representation in the FAO governing bodies and their Committees, as well as in other FAO fora is dominated by the Department of Agriculture. Representation in bodies other than the Conference and Council seldom is higher than the Deputy Assistant Secretary level and more usually comes from the ranks of career civil servants who are directors or deputy directors of line agencies in the Department.

7. The makeup of the U.S.–FAO Mission in Rome must be reviewed in light of: (1) The importance which the U.S. Government attaches to the FAO and (2) the purposes or functions which it believes the FAO can and should achieve. If the Mission is the primary link for day-to-day relations with FAO, if the United States views FAO as the leading international agency in the food field, and if its primary mission is to help developing nations, then the size and makeup of the U.S. Mission must be upgraded.

8. Americans participate in the FAO at many different levels and in many different ways: As participants in the governing bodies and

their Committees and in other FAO fora; as members of the U.S.-FAO Mission in Rome; as full-time employees of the organization in Rome or in the field; as U.S. governmental and nongovernmental personnel working in field projects in developing nations in which the FAO is at work on similar projects; as representatives of the United States in the capitals of member countries; and as U.S. nationals serving as individuals on major FAO Committees and in the Secretariat. No one in the U.S. Government monitors and coordinates all facets of our participation and assures that all participants officially representing the United States are speaking with one voice on policy.

9. There is confusion about who has the authority and responsibility to resolve interagency disputes and policy differences with respect to U.S. participation in FAO. Responsibility for day-to-day management and coordination of U.S. participation is shared by the State Department and the Department of Agriculture. Policy is made by means of an ad hoc bargaining process involving mid-level civil servants from these agencies. Although it is difficult to determine who has final authority and responsibility—short of the President—to make decisions, most disputes are resolved in favor of the Department of Agriculture.

10. Neither the Agriculture Directorate in the Bureau of International Organizations in the State Department nor the Office of International Organization Affairs in the Department of Agriculture is well-enough staffed or operates at a high-enough level to assure effective policymaking and participation. The United States is operating with virtually the same number of personnel and the same procedures as existed 20 or even 30 years ago.

11. The U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee is not a major factor in developing, approving or implementing U.S. policy toward FAO or in coordinating U.S. participation in the organization.

12. Nongovernmental advisers attach little significance to their membership on the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee. Participation of nongovernmental organizations in U.S. policymaking is nonexistent.

13. The process of preparing for a conference or setting policy and making decisions is more haphazard than the existence of the committee and its working groups suggests. Policy positions are often not determined in advance of conference and council sessions. Delegates often spend as much time negotiating among themselves as in negotiating with other delegates.

14. The U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee is not a policymaking or decisionmaking body. It is no more than a focal point for the process of ad hoc bargaining among interested agencies on an issue-specific basis. The committee is not an effective mechanism for developing a coherent policy or for resolving disputes with respect to the FAO.

15. Regarding its policymaking function, the United States looks upon FAO as if it has not changed since it was created in 1945. Its policymaking apparatus has not adapted to FAO's changing role, its growth in size and financial resources, and its increasing importance as a development oriented agency.

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Recommendations

1. In the future, if the United States seeks to reduce the level of FAO's regular budget, it should suggest eliminating specific programs or subprograms from the program of work and budget rather than suggesting across-the-board cuts.

2. The responsible Government officials should write and obtain official approval of a statement of U.S. policy toward FAO to determine clear and precise objectives, goals, and priorities for the organization and for U.S. participation in the organization. (A paper entitled "United States Objectives in FAO" was drafted and approved by the U.S.–FAO Interagency Committee and forwarded to the select committee on May 17, 1976.) This policy statement should be part of a larger strategy which the United States seeks to pursue in order to fight global hunger and malnutrition through increased food production and related policies. The U.S.–FAO policy statement should be used to guide the preparation of specific policy papers, as well as to guide those Americans who interact with the organization. Such a policy statement should be reviewed and updated annually. Those persons responsible for U.S. participation in FAO should report to Congress on the success or failure of the United States in achieving its objectives.

3. U.S. citizens serving on the FAO Program or Finance Committees as private individuals should not be assigned responsibilities for setting U.S. policy. They should serve only as resource persons to those responsible for developing U.S. policy or position papers.

4. The Senate Government Operations Committee should examine alternative ways of providing additional incentives to employees and employers in and out of Government to attract qualified Americans for service in international organizations in general and FAO in particular.

5. The Department of Agriculture and the Department of State should review their efforts to recruit and place qualified Americans in FAO positions. A new and intensive recruitment effort should be launched with the objective of achieving the level of representation in FAO that has been set for the United States.

6. The agencies involved should immediately establish an associate experts program which will allow young Americans to be employed by FAO.

7. The administration should review U.S. policymaking toward FAO. This review should seek clarification of responsibility for making and implementing policy, reorganization of the U.S.–FAO Interagency Committee and redefinition of the Committee's "terms of reference." The review should consider allocation of funds to assure that U.S. participation in the organization is not constrained by staffing and operating standards developed in the past. This review should be conducted in the context of FAO's changing role in the food policy subsystem and of the importance which the U.S. Government attaches to the organization as part of the subsystem.

8. Relevant congressional committees should give consideration to proposals for establishing within the executive branch a focal point for making and implementing national food and nutrition policy that includes a significant international food policy and a strategy for combating world hunger.

PART I. THE FAO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

1. The System of International Organizations

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) is only one unit of an increasingly complex system of international organization. It is a part of the United Nations system, but it is also a part of a larger system of international organizations of which the United Nations is one component. The FAO, moreover, is only one unit in what can be referred to as the food policy subsystem, a subsystem made up of international organizations, both governmental or nongovernmental, that have an interest in or responsibility for international or multilateral activity relating to food, agriculture—including forestry and fisheries—and nutrition.



To promote cooperation among nations, contribute to the maintenance of peace, and encourage action on common problems, a number of specialized agencies were created after World War II linking sectoral national agencies and interests in new international organiza-

tions. The FAO as well as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and, to some extent, the World Health Organization (WHO), were established, according to Nathaniel M. McKitterick, "primarily as 'collegiate' institutions, designed to bring specialists together to exchange information and experience and to set standards in their areas of special interest." [1]

Gradually, however, because of the demise of colonialism and the resulting growth in the number of sovereign states, the increase in U.N. membership, and the domination of the U.N. by less-developed nations (LDC's), the United Nations system has become more concerned with economic and social development in the LDC's than with the prevention of war.

As a result of the growth of power of the LDC's and shift of concern away from peacekeeping and to an almost exclusive concern—90 percent of resources and manpower—with economic and social development, a number of new agencies were created in the U.N. Secretariat to represent the interests of developing nations and to provide a springboard for the U.N.'s development activities. In 1968, Robert Asher observed that:

> The least development countries are not concerned about organizational neatness but about immediate results. When existing machinery appears to be inadequate, their response tends to be a vote for new machinery in which they will have greater control.[2]

Although there has been a proliferation of agencies concerned with development both within and without the U.N. system, there have also been other responses to the perceived needs of developing nations. Again, according to Asher, "The desired objectives can sometimes be achieved by modifying the terms of reference or work programs of agencies in being." [3] He also observed that "the bulk of the real work, insofar as the international promotions of economic growth and social change is concerned, continues to be done by the previously established agencies." [4]

What McKitterick said in 1965 about the specialized agencies created shortly after World War II is still true in 1976: "Today, the programs of the specialized agencies are an awkward combination of the original 'collegiate' functions and the new 'development' functions." [5] Moreover, with the exception of the regional banks, the U.N.'s specialized agencies, together with the World Bank group and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), are the only important

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[1] Nathaniel M. McKitterick, "U.S. Diplomacy in the Development Agencies of the United Nations," planning phamplet No. 122, National Planning Association, Washington, D.C., July 1965, p. 13.
[2] Robert E. Asher, "International Agencies and Economic Development," International Organization, vol. 22, No. 1 (winter 1968), p. 441.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid., p. 438.
[5] McKitterick, op. cit., p. 14.

operating as opposed to purely *consultative* multilateral aid organizations in which the United States participates.[6] The specialized agencies, including FAO, of course, were not created with this mission in mind and therefore suffer from a lack of clear goals and objectives. This effects their own efficiency and the efficiency of policymaking procedures in member countries.

FAO, then, is a specialized agency of the United Nations system which was created at a time when development was only an incidental concern in the world. FAO is a functional or "collegiate" institution as well as an operating agency engaged in development activities. It is part of a fragmented system of U.N. and specialized agencies, intergovernmental and functional organizations, highly independent voluntary special purpose funds, regional commissions and activities and world ad hoc conferences. Eleven year ago McKitterick noted some consequences of this proliferation and what he said then holds true today:

> The United Nations is very much a pluralistic agglomeration of organizations, each with an independent origin and program, and each tending to compete for the limited resources of personnel and funds available. As such, these branches of the United Nations have constituted since their inception a kind of world community, attacking its social and economic problems across a broad front and in a largely uncoordinated way.[7]

No wonder the U.N. system has been described as a "jungle" in which order, coherence, and coordination of policy and programs are nearly impossible.

In spite of this general belief, the U.N. does not lack coordinating bodies. The U.N. Charter assigns to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), under the authority of the General Assembly, the central coordinating role of the entire U.N. system. In 1966, ECOSOC established a Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC) to support its coordination activities. Coordination responsibilities for budgetary and administrative matters lie with the Advisory Committee on Administration ond Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). Cooperative arrangements involving more than three or four agencies are developed and supervised by the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), a standing committee of the executive heads of specialized agencies under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General.

The ACC operates with a preparatory committee and a network of subsidiary bodies including: the Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions; the Consultative Committee on Public Information; the Inter-Organization Board for Information Systems and Related Activities; numerous subcommittees; the Center for Economic and Social Information Program Committee; and working groups or study groups on space, youth and urban housing.

Also, functional groups consisting only of members of the ACC directly interested in a particular problem area and chaired by the

[6] Ibid., p. 3.
[7] McKitterick, op. cit., pp. 25–26.

head of the agency most concerned have recently been formed. The coordinating structure is as sprawling as the structure of international organizations which it seeks to coordinate.

The U.N. structure—as well as the world system of international organizations—has grown in an uncoordinated and almost random fashion. Changes in the focus and direction of the United Nations system have been accompanied by a proliferation in the number of international organizations and a change in the character of older organizations. The tendency has been to create new organizations in response to new or unresolved problems with the hope of stimulating existing organizations into creative action. This may be a useful phenomenon; however, it may merely put more people to work without the likelihood of substantial new benefits. At the very least, proliferation creates a need for coordination at the international level and within the governments of individual nations.

2. The Food Policy Subsystem

FAO is a part of a food policy subsystem made up of all international governmental and nongovernmental organizations with an interest in or responsibility for one or more aspects of world agriculture, food and nutrition policy. It is possible to compile a definitive list of all intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations which fit this description and to describe how, if at all, these organizations interact. In practice, however, it is difficult to determine which of the literally hundreds of international organizations are actually involved in making and implementing food policy. Theoretically, it also is possible for these international organizations to be part of a rational world strategy for eliminating hunger and malnutrition and assuring adequate human nutrition through increased and improved food production. But in reality, this is probably an impossible goal because of the complexity of the problem, the dynamics of international politics and the multiple and sometimes conflicting goals of the organizations themselves.

The food policy subsystem did not emerge intact from an international conference or the minds of international civil servants. It is the result of initiatives by a number of international actors—individuals, governments, organizations, and groups of organizations—as responses to events during the last 30 years and as reactions to international trends noted in the previous section.

Prior to the world food crisis that developed in 1972, FAO, along with other specialized agencies, was cooperating with the World Bank Group—International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Development Association (IDA), and International Finance Corporation (IFC)—in channeling funds into agricultural development projects. FAO shared responsibility in food, agriculture, and nutrition concerns with, among other international organizations, the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE AND THE FOOD POLICY SUBSYSTEM

The World Food Conference resulted in major changes in the food policy subsystem, particularly regarding the proliferation of organizations and the resulting fragmentation of the subsystem. The World Food Conference created two new institutions, two new committees, and one new voluntary special-purpose fund.

The Conference created the World Food Council to coordinate all U.N. food activities. This was done in spite of the existing coordinating mechanisms within the U.N. system. The Conference also asked the World Bank, FAO, and the U.N. development program (UNDP) to establish a Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment (CGFPI) to increase the flow of agricultural investments to developing countries. This mandate is similar to that of FAO's Investment Center and Industry Cooperative Program. Finally, the Conference proposed the creation of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) with assets of $1 billion. IFAD was directed to work closely with the FAO, the World Food Council, CGFPI, the World Bank, and the regional development banks.

The Conference also called for the creation of a new Committee on World Food Security within FAO. At the same time, however, it recommended that major grain exporters and importers establish an organization to accelerate the implementation of an international system of national grain reserves. Although the Committee on World Food Security was established by the 18th session of the FAO Conference in November 1975, negotiations on grain reserves have been proceeding but seem to be permanently stalled in the International Wheat Council in London.

The Conference recommended that the Intergovernmental Committee of the U.N./FAO world food program be reconstituted as the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs. This has been accomplished.

In other resolutions, the Conference—

Called upon the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) to implement its recommendations concerning research;

Recognized the work of the FAO, UNIDO, the World Bank, and private industry in increasing the availability of food production components such as fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides;

Underscored the importance of FAO's international fertilizer supply scheme;

Noted the fragmentation of responsibility within the U.N. system in nutrition and asked ECOSOC to consider creating a coordinating mechanism; and

Endorsed the FAO's global early warning and surveillance system.

The United States was largely responsible for the convening of the World Food Conference, and the U.S. delegation played a major role in Conference deliberations and decisionmaking. Nevertheless, administration personnel have been ambiguous about the decisions and actions of the World Food Conference. In a detailed memo dated July 18, 1975, and entitled "Notes Regarding Followup of World Food Conference," Dr. Ralph Phillips, Director of the Office of International

Organization Affairs in USDA, developed the thesis that most of the actions of the World Food Conference were "extensions of or increases in activities that were already planned by FAO, prior to the World Conference."

Both the defense of FAO and criticism of organizations established by the World Food Conference was echoed in Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Richard Bell's testimony before the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs on March 5, 1976. After complaining mildly about the general proliferation of international organizations, Bell said that: "Our view in the Agriculture Department is that we want to concentrate our efforts primarily in the old line agencies involving international food and agriculture, particularly the FAO, the International Wheat Council, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, when we get into matters relating to trade." [8]

Samuel Lewis, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, expressed a different point of view. Mr. Lewis said:

> Had FAO been doing the job that many countries thought it could do, I presume no World Food Conference would have been necessary.[9]

He went on to say:

> (I)t seems to me it is important to remember that it was because many nations, particularly developing nations, perceived the FAO to be more a traditional instrument for increasing agricultural production and exchanging technology and technological information among the developed countries, that the World Food Conference was required * * *.
>
> I don't think it is inaccurate to say each of the new agencies created, in concept at least, meets a need which was identified at the World Food Conference, and is overwhelmingly seen as a real requirement in the total institutional approach to the world hunger situation.[10]

In general, USDA is skeptical of the new organizational structures. One USDA official told staff members in rather strong language that both the World Food Council and the CGFPI were unnecessary bodies which could do nothing but talk because they lacked "delivery systems." The State Department, on the other hand, supported by representatives of many nongovernmental organizations represented at the Select Committee's hearings, believed that the creation of new agencies was the result of FAO's failures and that the new structures are very carefully targeted on specific functions not necessarily within FAO's jurisdiction or competence.

It is too early to judge these new organizations. But in addition to the possible benefits provided by them, there are also costs to be considered.

Proliferation of organizations puts a burden on the financial and human resources of both developed and developing nations. Governments must monitor these organizations and send representatives to the numerous meetings, preparatory committees sessions, and conferences sponsored by these organizations. Moreover, it is possible that

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[8] Testimony of Hon. Richard E. Bell, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs, "U.S. Participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations," hearing of the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Washington, D.C., Mar. 5, 1976, p. 91.

[9] Testimony of Hon. Samuel W. Lewis, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, "U.S. Participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations," ibid., p. 110.

[10] Ibid.

the developing nations do not have sufficient trained personnel and suitable capabilities to absorb efforts of both old and new organizations. Developed and developing nations alike seem to be caught up in a process of putting more and more resources into an expanding bureaucracy and less and less into programs which actually benefit people.

DEFINING THE FOOD POLICY SUBSYSTEM

The staff has compiled a list of international governmental organizations which are part of the food policy subsystem, beginning with organizations assigned responsibilities by the World Food Conference and including others which the 1974 edition of "U.S. Participation in the U.N." listed as having cooperative projects with FAO. To these were added all organizations not already included which are recognized by the Office of International Organization Affairs in USDA. Also included were international governmental organizations with "formal agreements" with FAO and representative organizations with "working relations" with FAO which were invited to the 18th session of the conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

The final list consists of 89 international governmental organizations which, in some greater or lesser way, have an interest in or responsibility for food, agricultural and nutrition issues, policies or programs. This list of organizations is a good approximation of the food policy subsystem of the world system of international organizations of which FAO is only one element.

Food Policy Subsystem

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

U.N. agencies

- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- United Nations Development Program.
- United Nations Environmental Program.
- United Nations Fund for Population Activities.
- United Nations Children's Fund.
- United Nations Industrial Organization.
- UN/FAO World Food Program.
- Protein Advisory Group.
- World Food Council.
- Regional Economic Commissions:
  - Economic Commission for Africa.
  - Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
  - Economic Commission for Europe.
  - Economic Commission for Latin America.

U.N. specialized agencies

- International Labor Organization.
- United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
- World Health Organization.
- International Monetary Fund.
- World Meteorological Organization.
- International Civil Aviation Organization.
- Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization.

Other U.N. agencies

- International Atomic Energy Agency.
- General Agreement on Tariff and Trade.

World Bank group

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
International Development Association.
International Finance Corporation.

Independent commodity councils

International Coffee Organization.
International Olive Oil Council.
International Sugar Council.
International Wheat Council.
International Cocoa Organization.

Regional and subregional banks

Inter-American Development Bank.
African Development Bank.
Asian Development Bank.

Autonomous commodity study groups

International Cotton Advisory Commitee.
International Wool Study Group.
International Rubber Study Group.

Others

International Fund for Agricultural Development.
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.
Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment.
Caribbean Organization.
Inter-American Statistical Institute.
Organization of American States.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Pan American Health Organization.
South Pacific Commission.
Office of International Epizootics.
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Science.
International Seed Testing Association.
Council of Europe.
Desert Locust Control Organization for Eastern Africa.
League of Arab States.
Organization of African Unity.
Organization of American States.
Afro-American Rural Reconstruction Council.
Arab Economic Unity Council.
Asian Productivity Organization.
Arab Center for the Study of Arid Zones and Dry Lands.
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.
Arab Organization for Economic and Social Development.
Cocoa Producers' Alliance.
Common Organization of African, Malagasy and Mauritian States.
Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux.
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
Council for Technical Cooperation in South and Southeast Asia.
European Economic Community.
European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization.
Inter-American Committee for Crop Protection.
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission.
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.
International Commission for Agricultural and Food Industries.
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas.
International Commission for the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries.
International Commission for the Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean Sea.
International Commission for the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries.
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea.
International Institute of Refrigeration.
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission.
International Regional Organization against Plant and Animal Diseases.
International Secretariat for Volunteer Service.

International Tea Committee.
International Vine and Wine Office.
International Whaling Commission.
Italian Latin-American Institute.
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission.
Permanent Commission of the South Pacific Conference.
Permanent Consultative Committee of the Maghreb.
Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration.
South Pacific Commission.

Several points must be stressed. First, emphasis was placed on intergovernmental organizations and on inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness. No attempt was made to compile an exhaustive list of international nongovernmental organizations which are considered by policymakers to be part of the food policy subsystem. This latter category would include international professional organizations; trade associations; fraternal, social, service, religious and charitable organizations; and private foundations.

Second, the organizations have different functions, including—

General purpose intergovernmental organizations;
General purpose functional or sectoral organizations;
Narrowly focused, single-purpose agencies;
Consultative groups which meet irregularly for discussion of issues and exchange of information: and
Operating or action-oriented agencies which actually execute programs or projects.

Some of these organizations have large budgets and staffs; other have relatively little of either. Some are effective; others are not. Some devote the vast proportion of their resources—human and financial—to the food policy subsystem; others devote only a tiny proportion to this area of activity.

Regardless of what characteristics apply to each organization, all are involved in some way with food policy, and all may be expending resources in this sector. Therefore, all the organizations must be considered to understand the world food effort and the U.S. role in this effort.*

Third, many, if not all, of these intergovernmental organizations are also part of a development subsystem. As noted earlier, all the specialized agencies of the United Nations are no longer merely "collegiate" agencies but are involved in development activities. Other organizations may also be a part of both subsystems. While the goals and objectives of the food policy and development subsystems may be complementary and reinforcing, the fact that an organization is part of both may diminish its effectiveness in each one. At the very least it adds to the complexity of the international system with which policymakers must contend. It means, among other things, that food policies and development policies must be carefully integrated.

Fourth, there is a potential for duplication and overlap among all these organizations, as well as a potential for programs that work at cross-purposes. Policymakers should consider how these organizations fit into a world strategy to combat hunger and malnutrition through increased food production. This is not being done at the present time. It is not an easy task, but it is an essential one.

*The Library of Congress has determined that the United States contributes to 38 "major" international food organizations.

Finally, to devise an effective policy for FAO, the organization must be viewed within the context of the food policy subsystem. FAO is only one component of this subsystem.

A complex system of international organizations confronts officials of the U.S. Government who must devise a policy toward FAO as well as an overall world food policy.

3. An Overview of FAO

INTRODUCTION

FAO was established for three purposes: To raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to secure improvements in the efficiency of production and distribution of all foods and agricultural products, and to better the conditions of rural populations.

This is a broad mandate. Virtually everything FAO does could be considered efforts to improve food production, processing, and distribution.

Because of this broad and somewhat vague mandate, FAO has evolved into a complex international organization whose structure and functions have grown and changed incrementally over time in response to changes in the international political, social, and economic environment in which it operates. This largest of U.N. specialized agencies is complex in its structure, in its finances, and in its programs. Each must be considered in order to understand fully the nature of U.S. participation in the organization.

STRUCTURE

The FAO is an organization of 136 governments. These governments direct the work of the Secretariat which, through a staff of about 6,000 at headquarters and in the field, executes the FAO program. Although FAO predates the United Nations, it is a U.N. specialized agency based on an agreement approved by the FAO Conference and the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA). This agreement provides for cooperation and consultation between the organizations on matters of mutual interest and concern. In no legal way, however, is FAO subordinate to or responsible to the UNGA or the Secretary General.

The Conference is FAO's governing body. It meets biennially and is made up of a representative of each member country, each with one vote. The Conference serves both as a legislature and as a forum for discussion. Among the legislative matters to which the Conference attends is the election of new members, the election periodically of a Director General, the approval of amendments to the constitution or rules of the organization, the approval of the Director General's "Program of Work and Budget" for the coming biennium, and the review of the various field programs carried out by FAO. In addition, the Conference elects members of the 42-member FAO Council that serves as the governing body between sessions of the Conference. Members of the Council serve 3-year terms. The United States has been a member of the Council since it was established in the late 1940's.

Although the FAO Council holds at least one full-scale session a year as well as shorter sessions immediately before and after biennial

sessions of the Conference, and although the Council is important in shaping the organization's activities and administrating FAO, much of the Council's work is carried out by its standing committees. There are eight such committees.

The Program Committee and the Finance Committee are made up of seven and five individuals, respectively, who are nominated by their governments and elected by the Council for 2-year terms. Once elected, these individuals serve on the committees in their personal capacities and do not represent governments. An American, Dr. Ralph Phillips, Director of the Office of International Organization Affairs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, is currently serving his second 2-year term as chairman of the Program Committee. This committee, as its name implies, advises the Director General as well as the Council and the Conference on "current and future programs of work and on long-term program objectives." [11] Its views are often decisive in shaping the program.

Up to the present biennium, an American has also always served on the Finance Committee. In last November's election, however, the nominee of the United States received only enough votes to be named first alternate. This action, plus the fact that representatives of only two developed nations (the United States and the Netherlands) sit on the seven-member Program Committee, is an indication of the growing influence of less-developed nations within FAO. The Finance Committee oversees all aspects of the organization's finances.

Five Committees of the Council, the Committees on Agriculture, Commodity Problems, Fisheries, Forestry, and World Food Security, are open to any member country that wishes to participate. The United States will participate in all five during the current biennium.

The Committee on Commodity Problems requires some elaboration. This committee, according to Phillips, "considers commodity problems of an international character affecting production, trade, distribution, and consumption of agricultural products." [12] It has created a number of subgroups to deal with specific commodities such as rice, oilseeds, oils and fats, bananas, various fibers and rubber. In addition the Committee on Commodity Problems created a Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal that is one of the very few aspects of FAO activities to have been given any attention by scholars in the United States.[13]

Another Council Committee is the Committee on Constitutional and Legal Matters made up of representatives of seven member countries. The United States has not sought membership on this committee in recent years.

The Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs reports to both the FAO Council and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) and has half of its 30 members elected by each. This committee is responsible for administering the joint U.N./FAO

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[11] Ralph W. Phillips, "FAO: Its Organization, and World and U.S. Participation" (Washington: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, FAS–M–93-Revised April 1969), p. 9.

[12] Ibid.

[13] See Robert L. Bard, "Food Aid and International Agricultural Trade: A Study in Legal and Administrative Control" (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Health and Co., 1972).

world food program.[14] This committee (formerly the Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program) was given a broadened mandate by the 1974 World Food Conference. The U.S. membership on this committee extends through 1976.

The Secretariat, headed by the Director General, services the governing bodies and is responsible for carrying out all aspects of FAO's programs. It is made up of the following major divisions and departments:

Agriculture Department

Land and Water Development Division: Water Resources Development and Management Service; and Soil Resources Development and Conservation Service.

Plant Production and Protection Division: Crop and Grassland Production Service; Plant Protection Service; and Crop Ecology and Genetic Resources Service.

Animal Production and Health Division: Animal Health Service; Livestock Research and Education Service; and Meat and Milk Development Service.

Agricultural Services Division: Marketing and Credit Service; Agricultural Engineering Service; and Food and Agricultural Service: and Food and Agricultural Industries Service.

Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Atomic Energy in Food and Agriculture.

Fisheries Department

Fishery Resources and Environment Division: Aquatic Resources Survey and Evaluation Service; and Aquatic Resources Improvement and Environment Service.

Fishery Industries Division: Fishery Industries Development Service; and Fish Production and Marketing Service.

Forestry Department

Forest Resources Division: Forest Conservation and Wildlife Branch; Forest Management Branch; and Forest Institutions and Education Branch.

Forest Industries Division: Pulp and Paper Branch; Mechanical Wood Products Branch: and Forest Logging and Transport Branch.

Economic and Social Policy Departments

Policy Analysis Division: Policy Studies and Situation and Outlook Service; Planning Assistance Service; Development Research and Training Service; and Global Perspective Studies Service.

Commodities and Trade Division: Basic Foodstuffs Service; Sugar, Beverages and Horticultural Crops Service; Commodity Policy and

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[14] The FAO and the U.N. have jointly operated the world food program (WFP) since 1963. The WFP concentrates on direct feeding and food-for-work projects. The direct feeding projects focus on the most vulnerable groups of the population, such as nursing mothers and preschool children, who are supplied with food at health centers which they are, then, encouraged to attend. The food-for-work projects distribute foodstuffs as family rations in payment or part payment for services in approved development schemes.

The WFP is administered by an executive director and governed by the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs. The Secretariat is located at FAO Headquarters in Rome, but operates more or less autonomously of FAO. The U.S. has pledged $155 million in commodities to the WFP for the coming biennium. In addition, the United States will pay freight charges of about $30 million and another $3 million in administrative funds for a total WPF pledge of $188 million. The total program for the biennium is in the range of $750 million.

The WFP and United States participation therein should be the subject of a separate study. Although in many ways linked to FAO and itself a vital part of the food policy subsystem, the WPF will not be focused on in this report.

General Analysis Service; Food Security and Information Service; and Raw Materials Unit.

Statistics Division: Statistical Development Service; Statistical Analysis Service; and Basic Data Unit.

Food Policy and Nutrition Division: Food and Nutrition Policy Service; Nutrition Programs Service; and Food Standards and Food Science Service.

Human Resources, Institutions and Agrarian Reform Division: Agricultural Education and Extension Service; Land Tenure and Production Structure Service; and Home Economics and Social Programs Service; and Development Organization and Institutions Service.

Development Department

(Subject-matter units only): Evaluation Service; Research Development Service FFH/Action for Development; Investment Center; and Industry Cooperative Program.

Office of General Affairs

(Subject-matter units only): Library and Documentation Systems Division; David Lubin Memorial Library; Systems and Project Development Branch.

According to figures supplied at the March 5 hearing by the Department of Agriculture, the Secretariat consists of 1,149 professional employees at the Rome headquarters, 2,212 professional employees in developing countries and 113 employees in five regional offices—one for Africa, Asia, and the Far East; one for Latin America, one for the Near East and one for Europe—and the FAO Liaison Office for North America in Washington and the FAO Liaison Office at United Nations Headquarters in New York. A support staff of about 2,500 assists the professional employees.

Complicating the structure of FAO are other groups established by the Conference or Council and serviced by the Secretariat, but which exist outside the governing structure of the organization. In general, these bodies provide an opportunity for intergovernmental consultations. According to Dr. Phillips,

> (e)xamples of such bodies are the European Commission for Agriculture, the European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, the International Poplar Commission, the International Rice Commission, the regional fisheries councils (including the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean; European Inland Fisheries Advisory Commission; Indian Ocean Fishery Commission; and Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council), and six regional forestry commissions (African Forestry Commission, Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission, European Forestry Commission, Latin American Forestry Commission, Near East Forestry Commission, and North American Forestry Commission).[15]

Other committees, ad hoc consultations or working groups are established from time to time to provide for the discussion of issues and problems common to many nations.

FINANCES

Funds to support the work of the organization come from assessments or contributions of member governments and other outside

[15] Phillips, op. cit., p. 10.

sources, mainly the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and trust fund arrangements.

The "Regular Budget" of the FAO, which is approved by the biennial sessions of the Conference, is financed by contributions from member countries based on a scale of contributions approved by the Conference and related to the economic situation of the member country. On this basis, the United States contributes annually an amount equal to 25 percent of the "Regular Budget." For the 1976–77 biennium this budget totals $167 million. The United States will contribute approximately $21 million in each of the next 2 years in support of that budget.

But the "Regular Budget" represents only about 20 percent of the financial resources available annually to FAO. Extra-budgetary or "nonregular budget" funds totaled $246.5 million in comparison to a regular budget of about $59 million in 1975. About $119.7 million of the $246.5 million in extra-budgetary funds came from UNDP. The remainder came from the following sources: Developing nations which contributed a portion of funds spent on UNDP/FAO projects; developed nations, such as Sweden and Denmark, which asked FAO to administer a portion of their bilateral aid funds; governments participating in the associate experts program; private individuals, groups, or businesses which contributed through the Freedom from Hunger and Industry Cooperative programs; foundations, international and voluntary agencies and multidonor projects, including the U.N. Fund for Population Activities, Sahelian Zone and Ethiopian drought relief operations, and the International Fertilizer Supply Scheme; the World Food program, which compensated FAO for services rendered by FAO; and the World Bank and Regional Banks. Agencies such as UNDP also made payments for overhead costs to FAO.

Activities financed by extra-budgetary funds are called the "Field Program," which is operated mostly for the benefit of developing nations. This is in contrast to activities, staff and services, called the "Regular Program," which includes the traditional activities of a collegiate organization for the benefit of all member countries.

There is, therefore, a distinction between the regular program financed by assessments and benefiting all member countries and the field program financed by a variety of extra-budgetary methods and made up of field projects benefiting developing nations. Field programs are dominant in the organization. But the FAO Conference merely "reviews" the field program while it "approves" the regular program.

It is difficult to put each FAO activity into one or the other program—regular or field—on the basis of the source of funding and the intended beneficiary. Confusion arises not only because headquarters staff engaged in regular program activities are called upon to service or assist field activities from time to time, but also because activities in developing countries which benefit individual countries are sometimes financed by the regular budget. No field program activity benefits all member countries; some regular program activity does benefit single countries.

Moreover, as pointed out by Joseph Marion Jones in his study of U.N. specialized agencies, the term "Regular Program" means many things:

It is sometimes used to refer to the technical and administrative staff at headquarters and regional offices as apart from the staff engaged in field operations. It is sometimes used to denote the "original" FAO activities . . . as distinguished from the field services rendered to governments in cooperation with other U.N. programs. It is sometimes used to mean FAO budget itself, apart from the funds supplied by other members of the U.N. family of organizations. And it is sometimes used to mean FAO staff, activities, and services at headquarters and in the field, paid out of the FAO budget as voted by the FAO Conference. The latter is the only meaning of the Regular Program which, technically, is *wholly* correct.[16]

All of these common sense definitions are to some extent accurate. The staff at headquarters and in the regional offices execute "Regular Program" activities; the original or "collegiate" activities of the organization are maintained in the "Regular Program" and funded by the "Regular Budget." And the "Regular Budget" appears to be FAO's sole budget, because FAO's governing bodies do not consider or control the "non-regular budget" which finances field programs.

PROGRAMS

As of January 1975, FAO was assisting in the execution of approximately 1,700 field projects in 126 countries and territories with a total aid allocation of $567.5 million. The UNDP-assisted projects accounted for 76.8 percent of the total FAO field program in terms of projects and 85.8 percent in terms of funds allocated.

The FAO review of field programs described the nature of these projects in the following way:

Broadly speaking, field projects implemented by FAO may be distributed into three categories: Surveys, feasibility studies and development schemes, and institution-building and training projects. Projects designed to carry out soil and water resource surveys with only incidental training or immediate development follow-up implications are included under surveys. The second category comprises projects intended essentially to identify, prepare, or appraise specific development schemes, including pilot schemes and resource surveys linked to such development schemes. Fisheries and forest resource surveys are best included under "Feasibility Studies and Development Schemes" because the great majority of such surveys are closely linked with the immediate identification and preparation of development schemes to exploit these resources. The third category includes all projects intended essentially to upgrade the research, training, and analytical capabilities and facilities of the recipient country's institutions through training national staff, organizing research, and strengthening the planning and management capabilities of these institutions.[17]

The latter two categories make up 52 and 46 percent respectively of the total UNDP/FAO projects, while surveys account for only 2 percent.

According to Assistant Secretary Richard E. Bell, "The Development Department (of the FAO Secretariat) maintains general supervision over the field programs. It maintains contact with UNDP and other donor agencies and countries, and with recipient countries, and provides overall coordination." He went on to say that "coordination and general servicing of field program activities" are the responsibility of operations services units within the Forestry, Fisheries and Agriculture Departments. In addition he said: "A significant portion

[16] Joseph Marion Jones, "The United Nations at Work: Developing Land, Forests, Oceans . . . and People" (Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1965), pp. 118–119. Emphasis in original.

[17] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Review of Field Programmes 1974–1975," C75/4, August 1975, p. 5.

of the time of FAO's regular program is devoted to provision of technical support for the field program.[18] This statement underscores the blurred distinctions between regular and field programs which gives rise to confusion in studying the organization.

Defining FAO's "regular program" is more difficult. In general, however, all those activities which relate to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information about all phases of food, agriculture, and nutrition, on the one hand, and all those which are related to provision of international fora for intergovernmental deliberation, consultation, and cooperation on matters of concern in these areas, on the other, constitute the bulk of the "regular program." They are funded by the "regular budget" and are approved in the program of work and budget submitted biennially by the Director General to the Conference.

FAO's massive publication program, including such items as country perspective studies that offer national agricultural policy options as well as the detailed documentation which is prepared for the various meetings, consultations, and working groups convened under its auspices, comprise the essence of the organization's regular program. Other, more development-oriented activities are funded, at least in part, by the regular budget. For example, one activity, highlighted in an FAO publication designed to inform the public about the organization and its activities, is that of helping to find funds for investment in agriculture. Between 1964 and 1974, under a cooperative program with the World Bank, the FAO's investment center—a part of the regular program—prepared 140 projects in conjunction with 66 countries involving some $2 billion in financing. "In 1974, World Bank approval of projects formulated by FAO in 18 countries led to $420 million in financing, up from $287 mililon the previous year." [19] The investment center also cooperates with other international financing institutions which invest in agriculture.

FAO'S EVOLVING MISSION

The history of FAO can be best understood in terms of a shift in emphasis from the regular program to the field program or, alternatively, a shift of emphasis from collegiate activities to developmental activities.

The original mandate of FAO was broad and vague. The organization that emerged from the Hot Springs Conference of 1943 and the Quebec Conference of 1945 was a compromise between those who wanted a strong action-oriented agency to foster agricultural development and those who wanted a more limited fact-gathering and advisory agency. According to Gove Hambidge:

> The organization that gradually took shape . . . was a compromise, more on the advisory than the action side but with the way open, constitutionally, to develop in whatever direction the member nations might find most useful.[20]

Although technical assistance was clearly on the minds of the founders of the organization and was authorized by the Constitution—article I, paragraph 3(a) reads: "It shall also be the function of the

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[18] Bell, op. cit., p. 130.

[19] "U.S. Participation in the United Nations." report by the President to the Congress for the year 1974, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., H. Doc. No. 94–266, p. 293.

[20] Gove Hambidge, "The Story of the FAO," (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1955), p. 53.

organization to furnish such technical assistance as governments may request"—the role of the organization at the outset was severely circumscribed. One observer noted in 1947 that FAO's primary function "is to collect, analyze, interpret, and disseminate information relating to its various fields of interest." Second, FAO may "promote, and where appropriate, recommend national and international action relating to research and the spread of knowledge." [21] Gunnar Myrdal, writing from the perspective of 1966, noted that in 1945—

> (i)t was . . . possible for the nations to discuss agriculture without giving very much thought to the needs of the poor peoples of the world. They were the responsibility of the colonial powers, who for obvious reasons were not eager to account for them before a world body; nor were the non-colonial powers eager to share the burden. . . . FAO could be viewed in 1945 as an organization for gathering statistics about crops, trade and related matters, and for technical consultation.[22]

Decolonialization created new pressures, however, and by 1966, Myrdal noted that "all technical intergovernmental organizations in the U.N. family have changed their character and become increasingly operational agencies for aiding underdeveloped countries." [23]

For the first several years of its existence, FAO's activities "were restricted to making technical studies, collecting statistics and disseminating them via publications and correspondence, calling and attending conferences, establishing technical commissions, and dispatch of occasional field study missions." [24] This was done by a headquarters staff, largely technical in competence, operating on a budget of $5 million a year contributed by member countries. This became known as the "Regular Budget" that financed the "regular program."

FAO began providing technical assistance to developing countries early, using authority granted by its constitution. Technical assistance missions to Thailand, Poland, and Venezuela were financed by the "regular program" in 1947–48. Moreover, the "field program" as we know it today—programs and projects for the benefit of developing nations financed by extra-budgetary funds—appears to have its origins in the same time period. Nine technical assistance projects, to countries such as China and Ethiopia, were financed by funds from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). During its first 5 years, however, FAO's fieldwork was limited because of the lack of funds, and the so-called "regular program" was dominant.

The emphasis began to shift to field activities with the creation by the United Nations of the expanded program of technical assistance (EPTA). Established to provide assistance to the poorest and most underdeveloped countries of the U.N. family, many of them newly independent, EPTA made available to FAO new resources which during the 1950's about equaled those in the regular program. With these resources, FAO assigned experts to advise and assist the governments of developing countries, organized seminars and training centers and provided fellowships for advanced study for persons from less-developed nations. In addition, field projects were supported

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[21] H. Belshaw, "The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations," International Organization, vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1947) pp. 296, 297.
[22] Gunnar Myrdal, "FAO: The Imperative of Altruism," The Nation, vol. 203 (December 19, 1966), p. 666. Note that this is the definition of the regular program.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Jones, op. cit., p. 109.

by funds from UNICEF and from trust funds established by individual countries.

The shift was accelerated by the creation in 1958 of the United Nations Special Fund. The Special Fund put additional resources at FAO's disposal for direct assistance to member countries in the form of much larger development-oriented projects than was possible under EPTA. The Special Fund supported "the surveys, pilot projects, and training facilities that are basic to a program of agricultural development and to the laying of the base for sound investment for development." [25] After 1958 FAO continued to receive EPTA funds and UNICEF funds and joint FAO/UNICEF projects underwent a rapid expansion.

During the 1960's, the "field program" continued to grow. In addition, the "regular budget" was substantially increased and other activities, such as the joint U.N./FAO world food program, the freedom from hunger/action for development program, and the joint FAO/IBRD cooperative program were launched. EPTA and the Special Fund were merged in 1965 to create the United Nations development program (UNDP) which today remains the largest single source of funds supporting FAO's fieldwork.

In the words of Samuel W. Lewis, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, FAO has gradually emerged "as a major executor of development assistance projects with responsibility for carrying out field projects funded by extra-budgetary resources, primarily from the United Nations development program." [26] In 1959 FAO was responsible for 16 UNDP projects. This grew to 287 by 1967. In 1975 the total of UNDP projects was 1,305 [27] Of this total, 550 were large scale with investments of over $150,000, and 755 were small scale—under $150,000. Altogether, counting projects funded from other extra-budgetary sources as well, FAO was involved in approximately 1,700 field projects as of January 1975.

FAO's transformation into a development agency occurred between 1956 and 1967 when Dr. Binay Ranjan Sen of India served as Director General. Toward the end of Dr. Sen's service, Joseph Marion Jones, an obvious Sen admirer wrote:

> The most important accomplishment of Dr. Sen's administration has been the transformation of FAO from a technical advisory organization into a development agency. When he took charge, the various technical and economic divisions of FAO were operating semi-independently rendering advice and assistance to governments as requested, without much attention to whether the government had any kind of plan for the best use of their limited resources.[28]

By 1964, in Jones' view, all this had changed.

Robert Asher also sees a transition occurring during Dr. Sen's tenure.

> The Food and Agriculture Organization, a club in which the less developed countries have long felt more at home than in most of the pre-1960 intergovernmental agencies, has been serving them more relevantly and diligently since launching its Mediterranean Development Project in 1958. It has been moving

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[25] Phillips, op cit., p. 12.
[26] Lewis, op. cit., p. 118.
[27] The figure of 287 for 1967 comes from the Christian Science Monitor, October 4, 1967, p. 4 quoting a report of outside experts. The figure for 1975 was supplied by Samuel W. Lewis in his testimony. Figures provided by UNDP to the Library of Congress do not correspond with these. UNDP reported that FAO was executing 784 UNDP-funded projects in 1967 and 1,672 in 1974 (no figures were available for 1975).
[28] Jones, op. cit., p. 136.

away from the provision of technical assistance on an uncoordinated, retail basis and become deeply concerned with the strategy of agricultural development.[29]

A 1967 review of FAO's organizational structure noted that in a matter of 11 years (from the beginning of Dr. Sen's tenure), programs expanded by 450 percent, staff increased by 300 percent, and the number of field experts increased by 400 percent. The report traced these increases to UNDP projects and to "the switch from the traditional consultative functions of FAO to development programs designed to stimulate action in the field." [30]

Today, FAO is fundamentally a development agency. But as one high-level FAO official pointed out in an interview with committee staff, the organization is in transition. Its two main functions, he said, are to provide agricultural information to developed and developing countries and to help the development of developing countries. FAO, he argued, has not adjusted its programs to this transition. According to the official, FAO needs to strengthen its efforts to seek aid for the most seriously affected nations (MSA's) and to do the necessary research to create institutions in such fields as credit and marketing to serve these nations better.

Focus on the Director General's program of work and budget—the "regular program" and the "regular budget"—leads to the conclusion that the organization is in transition and has not yet adjusted its program to fit this transition. The "regular program," however, consumes only 20 percent of FAO's financial resources.

Those who were most involved in the 18th session of the Conference of Food and Agriculture Organization and the sessions of the Council which took place before and after the November Conference, have noted a shift in emphasis in the "regular program" which may be related to this phenomenon. According to Curtis Farrar, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Technical Assistance, Agency for International Development, and an alternate representative to the 18th session of the FAO Conference:

> The principal shift in FAO's approach as represented by this Conference, and which I think the United States successfully furthered, through its participation in the Conference, was an increasing focus on helping the developing countries produce more food and helping them do it in a way that would benefit the majorities of people in those countries.[31]

Don Paarlberg, Director of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, and U.S. representative to the 18th session of the Conference, said at the December hearing:

> The historic mission of the FAO, as I have said before, has to be to try to improve the conditions of food and agriculture in the world, to improve the quality of agricultural production, to see that food supplies are distributed more appropriately, and that nutritional conditions in the world are advanced.
>
> That has been the historic mission. That continues to be the mission. This mission was given some additional emphasis and some degree of selectivity in the World Food Conference over a year ago, particularly the rebuilding of reserves, the enhancement of the World Food Program, the development of surveillance in a superior fashion with regard to emerging food problems in the world.

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[29] Asher, op. cit., p. 439.
[30] Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 5, 1967, p. 4.
[31] Testimony of Hon. Curtis Farrar, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Technical Assistance, Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, "Report on the 18th Session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations," hearing of the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Washington, D.C., Dec. 15, 1975, p. 19.

These were lifted out for additional emphasis and they have been built into the program of work and budget that came before the Conference.[32]

Dr. Phillips elaborated on the point of shifting emphasis and change of direction in the organization:

(O)ver the last decade or so, there has been a rather decided shift within the program toward activities relating to what might be classified broadly as the economic and social side.

In a world where the food problem as such—production and distribution—is such a large problem, there has been a definitive move on the part of the governing bodies in the last 2 years to move back more toward the technical side, to factors relating to production, and this is reflected to a considerable degree in the new Program of Work and Budget.[33]

The following summary, which elaborates further on this point, was provided for the record by USDA in response to Senator Charles H. Percy's question concerning the success or failure of U.S. initiatives in helping to achieve key actions at the 18th Conference.

Over the last two decades there has been a trend in FAO toward building up the economic and socially-oriented aspects of FAO's work, at the expense of the technical work aimed at increased food production and improved storage, processing, marketing and utilization of food and other agricultural products. The United States and a number of other countries made a strong effort, in the Sixty-first Session of the Council in November 1973, to have this trend reversed. This was followed up in subsequent sessions of the Council and some of its committees. As a result, the Program increase approved for the Agriculture Department for 1976–77 (compared with 1974–75) was 46.3 percent while for the Economic and Social Policy Department it was 18.9 percent.[34]

Assistant Secretary Lewis made the following comment at the March 5 hearing about the intentions of Dr. Edouard Saouma, the new Director General of FAO:

Dr. Saouma wants to get more emphasis on technical inputs to the production process itelf, technical advice, project planning, and solid impact on the actual food production problem, and less emphasis than perhaps his predecessor on broad economic and social surveys, studies, analyses, which have their use, but may have been overemphasized in the previous period.[35]

Dr. Saouma's proposals, scheduled to be made at an FAO Council meeting in July 1976, represent an effort to direct a part of the "regular program" and "regular budget" into development activities. A document released by the FAO summarized Dr. Saouma's proposals. The main trends in the proposed new policies are—

Greater emphasis on investment in food and agricultural production;

Establishment of a technical cooperation program which will give FAO a new immediacy and flexibility of action to respond to the urgent, short-term needs of member nations and to mobilize larger investment;

Decentralization to the country level in order to forge closer and more fruitful contacts with member nations for joint action on new policies regarding investment, technical cooperation, project identification, training, et cetera;

Greater use of existing national institutions and the active support of national efforts toward self-reliance;

A shift in FAO program emphasis away from theoretical, long-term studies toward more practical, short-term actions to obtain results at the country level;

Wider and more comprehensive training programs at the grassroots level for the farmers, fishermen and forestry workers;

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[32] Testimony of Hon. Don Paarlberg, Director of Agricultural Economics, U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Report on the 18th Session," ibid., p. 15.

[33] Testimony of Dr. Ralph W. Phillips, Director, International Organization Affairs, Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Report on the 18th Session," ibid., p. 16.

[34] Material prepared for the record by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Report on the 18th Session," ibid., pp. 37–38.

[35] Lewis, "U.S. Participation," op. cit., p. 111.

A redeployment of FAO's existing resources in order to adapt them better to the urgent and concrete requirements of all countries involved.[36]

FAO continues to evolve. The question now is not whether FAO is to become a development agency; that question was settled a long time ago. The agency is deeply involved in the development process and the vast majority of its resources go into this process. The question is whether a portion of FAO's "regular budget" should be put into development activities and whether the "regular program" should increasingly emphasize technical aspects of agricultural production rather than broader economic and social problems. It appears as if the U.S. Government supports putting greater emphasis on development and agricultural production.

The U.S. Government must now decide if it will support FAO's effort to assume all UNDP's functions in agricultural development, a move implied by the Director General's proposals. The alternative is for FAO to remain the major executor of UNDP's agricultural programs.

PROBLEMS IN FAO'S PROGRAMING AND STAFFING

Several of the witnesses who appeared before the Select Committee on March 4 criticized the FAO for not moving more quickly in development activities or for pursuing the wrong type of development activities. Herbert Waters traced the problem at least in part to the fact that FAO, born as a technical agency, is staffed in large measure by "very good agriculture technicians" but that these technicians may be "without much social orientation in modern development terms." [37]

Waters, along with Larry Minear of Church World Service/Lutheran World Relief, and Martin McLaughlin, a senior fellow of the Overseas Development Council, argued at the hearing for a shift from providing agricultural technical assistance to developing countries to assisting the design and execution of development projects to benefit the poor in rural areas. McLaughlin summed up this approach:

> (FAO) must avoid over-emphasis on sector analysis and narrowly delineated production projects and plunge into the dangerous but necessary effort to articulate people-oriented policies in the agricultural sector where nearly 80 percent of the people in the food-deficit countries live. * * * The FAO should be concerned about who benefits from projects, should broaden its concept of "projects" to include policy and other related considerations, should discuss policy alternatives country by country, and should lay greater emphasis on the World Food Program. . . .[38]

Criticism of FAO programing came from another witness at the March 4 hearing, Dr. Doris Calloway, professor of nutrition at the University of California at Berkeley. Dr. Calloway, who only recently returned to her post at Berkeley after spending a 6-month sabbatical as a consultant to FAO in Rome, echoed many other governmental

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[36] "New Directions for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations," mimeographed, no date, p. 2.

[37] Testimony of Herbert J. Waters, president, American Freedom from Hunger Foundation, "U.S. Participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations," hearing of the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs," Washington, D.C., March 4, 1976, p. 70.

[38] Testimony of Martin McLaughlin, senior fellow, Overseas Development Council, "U.S. Participation," ibid., p. 50.

and nongovernmental sources questioned by the committee staff in criticizing FAO's work in the field of nutrition.

She argued that nutrition programing is weak because of the view that malnutrition will be eliminated if more food is available as a result of increased food production and poor people have more money as a result of rising GNP. She called this the "food-supply gap" approach and said it is manifested in FAO's present emphasis on food production schemes and feeding schemes as the answer to malnutrition.

Because of the dominance of this approach and because of the absence of sufficient qualified staff in the nutrition field and the low priority assigned nutrition within FAO, she said that the possibility of implementing resolution V of the World Food Conference (which was aimed at improving nutrition in developing countries) was practically nil. She blamed the United States for pursuing policies which actually resulted in FAO seeking food production for its own sake rather than for the sake of improved nutrition.

Dr. Calloway proposed that reducing malnutrition become a major priority for the FAO. Food production alone will not achieve this objective, she said. What is needed is "a new approach in the form of technical assistance on policy/program design in which benefits will accrue to those most in need." The FAO should "seek a mandate which allows it not simply to respond to governments' demands but to express a view about FAO's purposes (i.e., reducing malnutrition and raising living standards); to have a view * * * of what is relevant and irrelevant; and to refuse intervention measures which do not advance its purposes or are trivial in these respects." This involves, at the very outset, doing more in the way of "defining and diagnosing the malnutrition problem and its evolving manifestations, both conceptually and practically in specific countries." [39]

In order to understand U.S. policy toward FAO it is necessary to note some problem areas which are frequently mentioned by informed observers. For example, FAO is said to lack clearcut objectives. A 1972 State Department working paper said that "it is fair to say that the organization is still far from achieving a coherent role or philosophy, from identifying clear-cut priorities both for field and regular programs and from integrating the two." [40] J. Kenneth Fasick, Director International Division, General Accounting Office, said at the March 5 hearing:

> An examination of FAO's current medium-term plan shows that its objectives continue to be stated in very broad terms. The plan seems to be a shopping list of everything FAO is involved with. It lacks a meaningful statement of priorities and it fails to define specifically how FAO's work can usefully promote improved production, storage, processing, distribution, and use of food and other agricultural, fishery, and forestry products.[41]

Fasick also noted that FAO needs a more effective system for reviewing and evaluating its programs and activities to learn if it is achieving its objectives.

Some observers believe that the FAO is ineffective in meeting its objectives not only because its program lacks focus and suffers from what one informant called "scatteration," but because the organization

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[39] Testimony of Dr. Doris Calloway, "U.S. Participation," ibid., p. 13.
[40] "The Determination of U.S. Objectives in the Food and Agriculture Organization," Xeroxed Jan. 8, 1973, p. 30.
[41] J. Kenneth Fasick, Director, International Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Participation," op. cit., p. 80.

is top-heavy with bureaucrats at its headquarters in Rome. Dr. Saouma himself has been critical of the bureaucracy in comments which have received wide coverage. He noted at a recent FAO Regional Conference in Lima, Peru, that 80 percent of FAO's regular budget was "destined to pay for a gigantic centralized bureaucracy in Rome, 11 percent to put out publications that no one reads and the remaining 9 percent to holding meetings and for travel expenses that are largely unnecessary." [42] An official of the World Food Council was quoted by the New York Times along similar lines in April 1975: "Like all bureaucracies FAO has built a big staff and many officials are interested more in tenure than in operations. They are defensive, surround themselves with safeguards." [43]

Perhaps the most scathing criticism of FAO as a do-nothing, bloated bureaucracy comes from Vincent H. Malmstrom, a professor of geography at Vermont's Middlebury College. Writing in the college's alumni magazine after having spent a 6-month sabbatical at FAO headquarters, Malmstrom said, "There were many evidences that FAO was grossly overstaffed. With no clocks to punch, no real boss to crack the whip, and no fear of being fired, most employees of FAO had found themselves an apparently 'ideal' situation—a well-paid job with little or no work." [44] Not only do professionals and support staff alike appear to lack for work, but they also doctor reports and statistical data to fit preconceived conclusions and generally are poorly prepared for the many conferences and meetings they are called upon to attend.[45]

Perhaps a partial explanation for Malmstrom's observations is found in another criticism of the organization, namely, that it is simply too dependent on the governments of its member countries and, more importantly, too subservient to the most significant bloc among the membership, the developing countries. Excolonials who used to dominate the FAO's professional staff are now giving way to what Malmstrom called the "newly independents." Almost all appointments beyond the most purely technical ones are made on political grounds. This affects all of FAO's operations and even its reports. FAO, it is said, dare not criticize its constituency, the developing nations, in its publications and reports. Moreover, the staff can only do what the member countries—or the majority thereof—want them to do and not what they, the staff, may believe should be done.

The growth of the organization and the increasing dominance of the developing nations has resulted, in the view of many, in a growing politicization of the organization. Ideological disputes which have dominated proceedings in the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council in recent years have been carried over into meetings of the FAO Conference and Council. Moreover, a small group of developing nations, according to the "Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Eighteenth Session of the FAO Conference," has

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[42] The New York Times, Apr. 25, 1976, sec. 1, p. 7. Dr. Saouma later released an English-language version of a text based on the French notes from which he was speaking when these remarks were made. The text reads: "In comparison (to WHO), if we look at FAO, we find that about 80 percent of its budget goes to meet staff salary costs—primarily in what is sometimes regarded as a gigantic centralized bureaucracy in Rome—11 percent to produce publications which are often not read and the remaining 9 percent to the holding of meetings and travel expenses which have at times been criticized as largely unnecessary." "Director-General's Lima Statement," duplicated, Apr. 23, 1976, p. 3.

[43] The New York Times, Apr. 27, 1975, p. 20.

[44] Vincent H. Malmstrom, "Roman Holiday: An Inside Look at the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization," Middlebury College News Letter (spring 1975), p. 31.

[45] Ibid., pp. 31, 32, 33.

"been pressing for FAO to play a fuller and more effective role in bringing about 'a new international economic order,' as expressed particularly in the resolution adopted in the sixth special session of the general assembly. It may be anticipated that pressures for change, in the general directions indicated by the general assembly special sessions, will continue." [46]

The FAO is a complex organization. It is a field program and a regular program. It is a complex made up of governing bodies, committees of governing bodies, semi-autonomous committees, commissions, working groups, and a massive Secretariat with 6,000 employees. Its programs and budget have grown and evolved in a haphazard way, creating programs that sometimes lack a clear-cut focus and seem unrelated to each other.

FAO is only one component of the food policy subsystem which is striving to deal with all aspects of world food, agriculture, and nutrition policy. This makes more difficult—and challenging—the role of U.S. policymakers in the international food field.

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[46] "Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Eighteenth Session of the FAO Conference," duplicated, no date, p. 52.

PART II. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN FAO

1. U.S. Policy Toward FAO

Ideally the United States should draft, approve, and execute a comprehensive food and nutrition policy. Such a policy would include both foreign and domestic aspects relating to agricultural production, processing, distribution and utilization.

One part of this policy, derived from the overall goals and objectives of the national food and nutrition policy, would be an international food policy. This policy would touch on such questions as trade, food aid, agricultural development and the relationship of food to foreign policy objectives. A part of this international food policy would be a world strategy for combating hunger and malnutrition through increased food production and related processes. This strategy would specify, among other things, the role which each of the international organizations in the food policy subsystem should play in achieving the objective. U.S. policy toward FAO could then be derived from this international antihunger strategy.

"The point," as the executive vice president of Ralston Purina, Paul Cornelsen, told the Select Committee in a statement prepared for the March 4 hearing, "is that there is no such thing as an FAO policy—it is simply part or should be part—of a larger overall policy."

"U.S. objectives for FAO should be developed within the framework of a *global* policy which encompasses all of our intended efforts toward improving food production and nutrition in the Third World." Cornelsen said. "This global policy should guide all U.S. agency activities, whether bilateral, multilateral, or through U.N. agencies." Policies and budgets for these agencies cannot be developed in isolation from each other, he argued. "The programs and budgets we apply toward the FAO must be evaluated as one part of a larger total. The first requirement is the enunciation of an overall policy approach and objectives encompassing all planned inputs to this huge task." [1]

Martin McLaughlin, a fellow of the Overseas Development Council, echoed the same theme and set the policy in an even broader context. "(I)t does not seem reasonable to try to formulate a policy toward FAO without treating that organization in the context of the overall question of the U.S. posture toward the problem of world hunger and underdevelopment which the FAO and other institutions have created to remedy." [2]

Unfortunately, the United States does not have an overall national food and nutrition policy or anything beyond a general international

[1] Testimony of Paul F. Cornelsen, "U.S. Participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations," hearings of the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Washington, D.C., Mar. 4, 1976, pp. 8, 9.

[2] Testimony of Martin McLaughlin, "U.S. Participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization," ibid., p. 52.

food policy. The main principle in this context is not to do anything to disrupt established channels of trade or artificially to control the operations of the free market. Moreover, the United States does not have a coherent, rational strategy for eliminating world hunger. Such U.S. policy toward FAO which does exist is made in isolation from policy toward other international organizations and with scant apparent reference to FAO's place in fighting world hunger and malnutrition.

In short, a coherent, rational, and explicit policy consisting of goals, objectives, and priorities for the FAO and the United States as a member of FAO does not exist. What exists are fragments of policy, some of which are broad and vaguely stated, some of which are very explicit, and some of which are generally understood by those responsible for U.S. participation in the organization but are rarely explicitly stated. All of these fragments need to be woven together into a written and approved U.S. policy toward FAO that will guide all aspects of U.S. participation in the organization.

The United States was largely responsible for FAO's creation (President Roosevelt called the 1943 Hot Springs Conference which began this process), provided much of the staff and funds that saw it through its early years, and provided three of the first four Directors General (and at least a Deputy Director General at all other times).

President Truman's early directive to the Secretary of Agriculture and the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee to insure "that our Government aids to the fullest extent the proper functioning of the FAO" coupled with the congressional resolution authorizing U.S. participation in an organization which would "provide an adequate research, informational, and statistical service for the industry of agriculture" set the tone for U.S. policies toward FAO which still prevails today.

FRAGMENTS OF A U.S. POLICY

The United States has pursued a policy of support for the FAO in spite of some specific disagreements with the organization, its governing bodies, and Secretariat, or about its program and budget. The United States appears likely to remain supportive, not only because of historical links with the organization but because it is perceived to be consistent with a range of U.S. foreign and agricultural policy interests to remain active.

One aspect of this support of the organization is the longstanding role of the United States as the organization's major financial supporter. Table I indicates how much the United States has contributed each year since 1951 to the regular program. Table II estimates the proportion of the U.S. contribution to the United Nations development program (UNDP) which may have found its way to FAO in support of the organization's field program. In the context of the overall U.S. budget, these figures are not large. But in the context of the FAO, U.S. contributions have meant the difference between a solvent organization and a bankrupt one.

TABLE I.—U.S. FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO FAO FROM 1951 TO 1975

Year	Total FAO budget	U.S. assessment	U.S. assessment as percent of entire FAO budget
1951	$5,025,000	$1,355,000	27.1
1952	5,225,000	1,567,500	30
1953	5,250,000	1,554,000	30
1954	6,000,000	1,777,650	30
1955	6,000,000	1,767,000	30
1956	6,600,000	2,034,900	31.5
1957	6,800,000	2,085,300	31.5
1958	8,500,000	2,705,645	32.51
1959	8,500,000	2,705,645	32.51
1960	9,490,025	2,999,210	32.51
1961	9,490,025	2,999,210	32.51
1962	14,595,400	4,591,668	32.02
1963	14,595,400	4,591,668	32.02
1964	19,419,150	5,688,353	32.02
1965	19,419,150	5,688,353	32.02
1966	25,199,500	7,604,153	31.91
1967	25,199,500	[1] 7,604,153	31.91
1968	29,930,500	8,749,722	31.91
1969	29,930,500	[2] 8,749,722	31.91
1970	31,940,000	10,083,458	31.57
1971	31,940,000	10,083,458	31.57
1972	46,810,000	[3] 14,754,512	31.52
1973	46,810,000	12,650,832	31.52
1974	53,350,000	13,547,500	25.00
1975	53,350,000	13,547,500	25.00

[1] U.S. received a prior year credit of $53,748, making a net contribution of $7,550,405.
[2] U.S. received a credit from prior year surpluses of $413,540, making the net contribution $8,336,082.
[3] U.S. received a credit of $2,103,680 from the tax equilization fund, making the net contribution of the United States $32,650,832.

TABLE II.—U.S. FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO FAO PROGRAMS VIA UNDP, 1967–74

Year	U.S. contribution to UNDP	Percent of total UNDP expenditures on FAO-executed projects	U.S. dollars in support of FAO field programs
	(1)	(2)	(1×2)
1967	70,000,000	26.5	18,550,000
1968	75,000,000	27.2	20,400,000
1969	71,000,000	25.5	18,105,000
1970	86,268,000	26.9	23,206,000
1971	86,300,000	26.2	22,611,000
1972	86,000,000	23.9	20,554,000
1973	90,000,000	23.0	20,700,000
1974	70,784,000	20.7	14,652,000

Coupled, however, with generous financial support of the regular and field programs has been a general effort to restrain growth in the FAO budget and to retard program expansion. For some while, the U.S. contribution to the FAO was limited by law to no more than $1,250,000 annually. Even after this limitation was lifted in favor of a limit of 33 percent of the budgets of U.N. bodies and specialized agencies and before the 1972 legislative action lowering that limit to 25 percent, the United States continued (as it does today) in general to oppose budget increases and program expansions.

According to one scholar, Joseph Marion Jones, "The United States, over the years, has generally sought both overtly and behind the scenes, to restrain the expansion of the budget, no matter what in-

crease was proposed, and on several occasions it has openly and strongly opposed the Director General's proposals." [3]

The public record contains other evidence of how major U.S. governmental agencies view FAO, its objectives, and its priorities. These views, sometimes contradictory but mostly compatible, give some clues about U.S. policy toward FAO.

One view was provided by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz in a speech to the plenary of the 18th session of the Conference of the FAO in November 1975. Secretary Butz suggested that FAO give new emphasis to developing strong national research institutions, improving extension services, increasing the number of trained midlevel agricultural personnel, encouraging agricultural investment, and balancing food production with population growth. He also suggested that FAO hasten its own decentralization and make better use of national institutions in member countries.[4]

This was a specific outline of priorities for FAO. And coming from the individual designated by the President of the United States as the one to take the lead on international agricultural policy and FAO matters, one can assume that the Butz statement closely represents U.S. policy toward the FAO. There is little evidence, however, that the Butz agenda affected the work of the delegation to the 18th Conference or of those who shaped the policy positions which the delegation took to Rome.

At the March 5 hearing, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Richard E. Bell said the following about U.S. policy toward FAO:

> With respect to how the Department of Agriculture sees the objectives of FAO, we believe the prime objective of FAO should be to provide technical support to help developing countries increase their food production.
>
> Second, we think that the FAO should help developing countries improve their nutrition.
>
> And third, we think a prime function of FAO is to gather and disseminate information on the world food situation.
>
> * * * [W]e look on (the FAO) as being the paramount world organization with respect to matters related to food and agriculture.[5]

In his prepared statement, Bell phrased this a bit differently. He said, "FAO is the chosen instrument of the United States for agricultural cooperation and development on the broad international front." [6]

Bell said at a later point that USDA "believes that the FAO should be primarily concerned with the technical aspects of world agriculture, and particularly in increasing agricultural production in these lesser developed countries." FAO, he said, should have a "central role" in the effort to focus more international attention and resources on "the technical aspects of raising food production capability in the developing countries." He said he felt that addressing the issue of agricultural development within a broader development context was "begging the issue" and detracted attention from getting on with the job of "trying to help the developing countries increase food produc-

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[3] Joseph Marion Jones, "The United Nations at Work: Developing Land, Forests, Oceans—and People" (Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1965), p. 145.

[4] For a summary of the Butz speech, see "A Report on the 18th Session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations," hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Washington, D.C., Dec. 15, 1975, p. 36.

[5] Testimony of Hon. Richard E. Bell, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs, "U.S. Participation," op. cit., p. 89.

[6] Ibid., p. 105.

tion." He noted that other agencies might not agree with the views he had articulated about FAO.[7]

The view of Herbert Waters, President of the American Freedom from Hunger Foundation, of U.S.-FAO relations is different from the official position just cited. He said, "As far as I can see, the FAO is regarded by the United States as just another United Nations specialized agency, one among many—treated no better and no worse, but certainly given no priority and little attention at all at major policy levels of our Government." [8]

Samuel Lewis, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, expressed at the March hearings a different view of FAO's objectives and priorities. While acknowledging that FAO must continue to fulfill its traditional role of serving the agriculture of the developed nations, he said:

> We think the FAO has the capacity to make an even greater contribution to improved agriculture and overall economic development, especially in some of the key countries of the developing world.
>
> In our view it needs to become more action oriented and attain a greater balance between long-term activities and programs producing impact within the short range. . . .
>
> We hope (that the Director-General's proposals) will include a serious intensification of FAO's work on food production, particularly in the developing countries, and that FAO will take a strong lead in reducing post-harvest crop losses on a global basis.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> FAO might focus on activities such as demonstration projects, training seminars and other means of gathering and disseminating information. The Organization should reject matters such as establishing food reserves in LDC's, or developing national planning capacities, an activity which most governments can and should do themselves.[9]

Lewis's remarks were oriented toward the future and what FAO should become. The State Department is not completely satisfied with FAO today.

Traditionally there has been conflict between USDA and the State Department over which aspects of FAO's program to emphasize. Writing in 1965, McKitterick said:

> For some time, the choice facing FAO has been either to curtail "collegiate" activities in favor of new work assigned by the Special Fund or to increase the FAO budget so that both kinds of activities could go forward hand in hand. While the State Department has favored curtailment of "collegiate" activities in favor of "development" activities, the Agriculture Department has a natural interest in most of the "collegiate" activities that might be curtailed. The Department of Agriculture is officially represented at nearly 40 FAO technical conferences each year. The "old boy" network among agricultural specialists around the world is well established, and Agriculture argues, with some justification that the maintenance of this network is important to U.S. policy—as important, perhaps, as several development projects.[10]

McKitterick concluded that while there was agreement on the need for economy in FAO operations, there was disagreement between USDA and the State Department on the "relative priorities to be attached to FAO's various functions." He said this caused "confusion

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[7] Ibid., p. 90, 94, 97.

[8] Testimony of Herbert J. Waters, "U.S. Participation in the FAO," March 4, 1976, p. 67.

[9] Testimony of Hon. Samuel W. Lewis, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, "U.S. Participation," op. cit., pp. 121–122.

[10] Nathanial M. McKitterick, "U.S. Diplomacy in the Development Agencies of the United Nations," Planning pamphlet No. 122, National Planning Association, Washington, D.C., July 1965, p. 34.

in the minds of both the FAO Secretariat and our European allies about the real aims of U.S. policy." [11] These comments underscore the need to draft clear and coherent policy which will establish a government-wide approved and accepted view of FAO's objectives and priorities.

AID's view of FAO is relatively clear. At the March 5 hearing, Daniel Parker, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, said:

> * * * AID views FAO primarily in the context of an overall strategy for promoting agricultural and rural development in the developing world, and to do so in a manner that benefits the poor majority in the less-developed countries. Since this is the principal emphasis of our bilateral development assistance program, we see FAO activities as a very high priority within the U.N. development context. We also seek to cooperate with FAO in terms of specific development problems, for example, improving nutrition or strengthening rural development in developing countries.
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> * * * * * * *
>
> We see FAO * * * playing a key role in providing the feasibility studies and technical assistance needed to implement the increasing levels of UNDP assistance; and the high lending levels of the existing international financial institutions.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> We see FAO strategically placed as an international institution to help the developing countries design agricultural and rural development strategies and policies leading to increased food production and consumption and effective rural development.[12]

Given the compatibility in goals and objectives between AID and FAO and the importance of the field program and the extra-budgetary resources supporting it within the context of FAO's overall program, and given, finally, that these trends are likely to accelerate in coming years, it is surprising that AID does not play a larger role in designing and executing U.S. policy toward the FAO. Suffice it to say that AID does not have any personnel devoting full time to relations with FAO or to policymaking activities with respect to the organization.

In addition to its support for the organization and its budget, the United States does have a set of views about the organization's priorities and our country's relationship to it. Because of differences in formulation of these views by the concerned agencies, it is difficult to determine if these views are compatible with one another and if a consensus exists within the U.S. Government about FAO's objectives.

Another aspect of policy relates to how the United States might better influence the organization. After recommending, in a closing section of the "Official Report of the U.S. Delegation to the 18th Session of the FAO Conference," that "the United States maintain and strengthen its leadership in FAO affairs," the Delegation suggested three ways to accomplish this objective: (1) "Draw more fully upon its (the United States') competence in agriculture, fishery and forestry science and technology in making contributions to FAO activities, particularly in the many FAO fora where such matters are discussed." (2) "Devote more attention to the development of substantive policies and programs in FAO." (3) "Express more strongly * * * our opposition to actions which are either contrary to U.S. interests and poli-

[11] Ibid.
[12] Testimony of Hon. Dan Parker, Administrator, Agency for International Development, "U.S. Participation in the FAO," Mar. 5, 1976, pp. 128, 129.

cies, or that may impair FAO's effectiveness as a strong substantive organization." [13]

If the United States should "draw more fully," "devote more attention," and take other actions, then the United States probably has not been doing a sufficient amount in the past or has not articulated these objectives previously in a way which could be easily understood by all participants. At the very least, a standard by which to judge U.S. activities now exists. Several questions remain which should be answered. Will these objectives be adopted as official policy? Who will implement them? How will these general statements be translated into concrete actions?

"ISSUE-SPECIFIC" POLICY

U.S. policy toward FAO has tended to be, in the words of a witness from the American Home Economics Association, "situation-or-issue specific." [14] This means that the United States formulates a policy position only when confronted by the need to act in response to a specific event, be it an upcoming meeting of the governing bodies, a technical consultation in a foreign capital or a remark by a high official of the Secretariat. These situation-or-issue-specific policies tend to be negative and reactive rather than positive and creative. In part, this is the result of the interagency bargaining process by which these positions are determined. Faced with deadlines and widely diverging points of view based upon differences in constituencies, policymakers formulate positions based on the lowest common denominator of agreement. U.S. positions become bland and unimaginative. Differences are obscured and are likely to arise again in other contexts.

In advance of the 18th Session of the FAO Conference, mid-level civil servants from several executive branch agencies put together a number of issue-specific position papers in response to the documentation prepared by the FAO Secretariat for each of the items on the Conference agenda. The paper on medium-term objectives reflected the view that FAO should be more action oriented:

> (T)he technical aspects of FAO's work relating to the production, storage, processing, distribution and utilization of food and other agricultural, fishery and forestry products constitute the lifeblood of FAO.
>
> It also follows that FAO has permitted itself to become diverted to an undue degree from its central technical role by concentrating an undue proportion of its resources in policy planning and related activities. While in no way wishing to intimate that FAO should abandon work in the economic planning, nutritional planning, international agricultural adjustment, and country-perspective study areas, these activities should be related in a more rational way to the over-riding importance of food production, processing, storage, distribution and utilization if the world's present and growing food needs are to be met. One specific example of the need for better balance may be found in the nutrition area: At an earlier stage the emphasis was on such technical aspects as nutritive requirements, nutritive value of foods and surveys of food supplies. Now the pendulum has swung toward nutritional policy planning. That pendulum needs to swing back to an intermediate position.[15]

During the interagency bargaining process before the Conference AID opposed this position on the ground it was incompatible with the

[13] "Official Report of the U.S. Delegation to the 18th Session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations," duplicated, no date, p. 53.
[14] Testimony of Dr. Gladys Vaughn, "U.S. Participation," Mar. 4, 1976, p. 33.
[15] "Medium-term Objectives," position paper for Agenda Item 14, duplicated, Oct. 22, 1975, p. 4.

U.S. support of World Food Conference resolutions. AID is committed to nutrition planning in a significant way in its own bilateral food and nutrition programs under the Foreign Assistance Act. Although the paper was not changed, at the Rome Conference the spokesperson for the United States on this agenda item did not attack nutrition planning, but called for more balance in FAO's nutrition programs.

Differences were not resolved but only muted. This also occurred in the context of the issue of research. At the outset, AID took sharp exception to USDA's position—which was incorporated in the U.S. position paper on research—in support of the program committee's—chaired by USDA's Phillips—refusal to allow regular program funds to be used in support of research activities. AID eventually supported USDA's position for technical reasons, but differences remain about FAO's future role in research and about its relationship to the consultative group on international agricultural research (CGIAR). The lack of consensus among agencies on this topic is reflected in this statement from the Official Report of the U.S. Delegation to the 18th Conference:

> There is also need for the development of a governmentwide view of FAO's role in research as a guide to our participation in discussion in various fora where the issues may arise.[16]

On an issue of more immediate, short-term importance, the level of the budget for the next biennium, U.S. policy was unclear. The United States followed its traditional course of seeking to restrain program expansion and budget growth throughout the preparation of the Director General's proposals for the 1976–77 biennium. The U.S. position paper drafted in response to the program of work and budget said the United States would support the proposed level of $167 million. An alternative draft was circulated by the State Department, but the two were never combined. In Rome the delegation was instructed to reduce the budget by $10 million or vote against it—the source of the instruction is not clear. Negotiations to achieve this objective were belated and unsuccessful, and the United States ended up reluctantly supporting the proposed budget level.

Two points need to be underscored here. First, issue-specific policy sometimes ends up being no policy at all. Second, issue-specific policymaking, such as on the matter of FAO's regular budget for 1976–77, means that policy is developed without reference to larger issues and policies such as the overall strategy to combat world hunger and malnutrition. An arbitrary goal of cutting FAO's budget by $10 million indicates nothing more than a steadfast adherence to the traditional U.S. position of seeking frugality above all else.

The staff recommends that in the future, should the United States seek to reduce the level of the regular budget, the United States should identify specific programs or subprograms to be eliminated from the program of work rather than propose an across-the-board cut.

A FORMAL STATEMENT OF U.S. OBJECTIVES AND POLICY

Fragments of U.S. policy toward FAO exist. But repeated attempts over the last dozen years to draft and approve a set of goals, objectives,

[16] "Official Report," op. cit., p. 54.

and priorities for FAO and for U.S. participation in the organization have failed.

In March 1966, the President of the United States directed the Secretary of State to continue to direct and coordinate the activities of the U.S. departments and agencies involved in international organization affairs and to instruct U.S. representatives to the organizations. The President's memorandum said, in part, "I shall look to you to direct this Government's work in reviewing and establishing our long-term policy objectives in each major international organization."

Before the Johnson memorandum of 1966 was received, an exercise had started aimed at developing a policy statement on FAO. According to the terms of reference of this exercise, headed by the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs—the chairman of the FAO Interagency Committee—"When approved by the Secretary of State, the policy statement on FAO will provide a guide for planning, programing, and budgeting with respect to that agency." Although this seemed to be a valid objective, the United States lacked an approved policy statement until May 1976.

A November 1969, GAO report described the repeated attempts to develop such a paper. These drafts, the GAO noted, "have been somewhat deficient in that they did not set forth priorities which the United States accorded FAO programs." [17]

GAO recommended that the Department of State together with the USDA "(e)stablish long-range policy objectives and program priorities relative to U.S. support of FAO." It recommended that this be done "with dispatch." [18]

In hearings of the House Government Operations Committee in 1970, the Department of State submitted a paper which was prepared by the Department of Agriculture—with the assistance of the Department of State—"in response to the GAO recommendations." In submitting the document the State Department noted that the document "is still under review." [19] For a long while, however, it remained the only definitive policy statement most Government officials could refer to.

The document, entitled "U.S. Objectives in FAO—A Restatement of U.S. Objectives in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations," made the following points.

1. "FAO has . . . evolved into a major force in international agricultural affairs. Therefore, although the United States will wish to continue many bilateral activities and approaches, FAO must be the chosen instrument of the United States for agricultural cooperation and development on the broad international front." [20]

2. "United States and FAO objectives, aimed at increasing standards of nutrition and living, improving efficiency of agricultural production and distribution, bettering conditions of rural populations, and contributing to an expanding world economy, are compatible." [21]

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[17] "U.S. Financial Participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations." U.S. General Accounting Office. Nov. 17, 1969, p. 14.
[18] Ibid., pp. 14, 16.
[19] Statement submitted for the record, "Economy and Efficiency of U.S. Participation in International Organizations," Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, House Committee on Government Operations, Washington, D.C., Sept. 18, 1970, p. 100.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

3. "In general, it may be said that FAO's efforts to achieve its purposes are not only in accord with U.S. objectives but that they supplement, support, and extend well beyond the efforts the United States is able to make bilaterally in support of its objectives." [22]

4. Because of the compatibility of objectives and because of FAO's status as a major international agricultural organization, the United States should attempt to avoid confrontation in FAO forums, promote constructive approaches to program development, provide adequate financing, and insure that competent U.S. nationals hold a reasonable proportion of policymaking and operating positions in the organization.[23]

The bulk of the paper attempts to indicate ways in which the United States benefits from membership in FAO or ways in which FAO's work complements U.S. efforts. The United States tries to justify its participation in terms of advantages or benefits to agricultural interests at home.

For example, in discussing FAO work in agriculture, the paper notes that its activities:

> are contributing substantially to knowledge and to improving the efficiency of production and distribution of agricultural products. Many of these, such as work on animal and plant pests and diseases, and on animal and plant genetic resources are of direct benefit to the United States. . . . Others, while of less direct benefit, are of importance to the United States in that they contribute to overall economic development in the world. They also contribute knowledge which can be applied in agricultural improvement efforts in the United States.[24]

Or, on the work which is done in economics and statistics:

> FAO provides a forum not otherwise available for the discussion of agricultural economic issues with other countries, and has a substantial capacity to carry out economic studies which contribute to greater understanding of these issues. Thus, the United States has a very definite interest in and benefits from the economic activities of FAO, and its own work and interests interlock closely with those of FAO.[25]

There is no effort to analyze critically the priorities and programs of the FAO, but to compliment them all rather blandly. This is an unrealistic view of the position of the United States toward the organization. The United States, as noted earlier, favors revision of FAO priorities. The United States believes FAO should be more action oriented and less concerned with world social and economic studies. Another example will help to make the point; it relates to the view of FAO's statistical and economic work noted above.

The 1974 edition of "U.S. Participation in the U.N." contains this statement about FAO's work:

> The production of international agricultural statistics continued to be one of FAO's most valuable and dependable contributions to member governments.[26]

The implication is that the United States, too, benefited from such data and studies.

But in a recent GAO study of USDA's agricultural attaché system, the Department took a different view. In explaining why the attachés, who are part of the Foreign Agricultural Service of USDA in

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[22] Ibid., p. 102.
[23] Ibid., p. 103.
[24] Ibid., p. 105.
[25] Ibid.
[26] "U.S. Participation in the United Nations," report by the President to the Congress for the year 1974, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., H. Doc. No. 94–266, p. 295.

which the Office of International Organization Affairs is located, do not have greater contacts with FAO, the Agriculture Department said:

(R)elying on FAO as a primary source of information poses two major difficulties. First, FAO official statistics are not always the best source of information. Second the timelag inherent in FAO publications make the information less timely than that obtained from attachés and other sources." [27]

The 1970 objectives paper seems more like a paper designed to justify continued U.S. support of FAO rather than to define short-term or long-term policy objectives. The paper institutionalizes a policy perspective noted by GAO in 1969: "Little substantive attention has been devoted to program content and priorities." As we mentioned earlier, U.S. policy seems to consider the budget "level" and the degree of "program expansion." [28] The primary U.S. objective is to hold down both.

A GAO followup study of July 1974 makes no mention of the 1970 document, a document which was written in response to the earlier report. The 1974 GAO report states: "Our November 1969 report recognized that efforts had been underway since 1965 to establish a national policy paper on FAO. No such paper yet exists, but a new effort is underway." [29]

That "new effort" turns out to be an "internal paper," prepared in the State Department.

"The paper," according to GAO,

does not attempt to develop U.S. objectives but rather studies problems associated with the task and asserts that establishing objectives is a function of U.S. foreign policy interests. These interests, as they affect agriculture, are identified as trade, disposal of surplus agricultural commodities, development programs, multilateral institutions, and other general areas. The paper explores whether FAO should be development-oriented or policy oriented (but makes no choice) and examines questions of priorities, performance, evaluations, and information needed to make policy judgments. It concludes that an immediate effort should be made to develop a complete and succinct statement of U.S. goals and objectives and to recommend courses of action for achieving them.[30]

The paper does assert that the primary U.S. interest which FAO serves is development assistance and asserts further that U.S. objectives should therefore be derived from that interest.

Why is such a document needed? One reason is underscored by the following material from the "Office Report of the U.S. Delegation to the 18th Session of the FAO Conference." The views and proposals of the United States with regard to a possible reorientation of the program of work and budget based on the goals and priorities of the new Director General "should * * * be elaborated as rapidly as possible with a view to presenting them in private discussions and governing body session as appropriate." [31] Without some clear-cut goals, objectives, or priorities of our own, how can these U.S. "views and proposals" be determined?

Another reason, pointed to repeatedly over the years by GAO, and noted once again by its representative, J. Kenneth Fasick, at the

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[27] "The Agricultural Attaché Overseas: What He does and How He Can Be More Effective for the United States," U.S. General Accounting Office, Apr. 11, 1975, p. 45.
[28] "U.S. Financial Participation in the FAO," op. cit., pp. 19, 21.
[29] "Numerous Improvements Still Needed in Managing U.S. Participation in International Organizations," U.S. General Accounting Office, July 18, 1974, p. 13.
[30] Ibid., p. 14.
[31] "Official Report of the U.S. Delegation," op. cit.

March 5 hearing, is that "everybody involved" in U.S. participation in FAO, "would have better guidance in terms of meeting the long-range goals than they have today." [32] It is by reference to a clear, unequivocal policy standard that it is possible for these participants rationally to make decisions on a day-to-day basis and for those ultimately responsible effectively to manage U.S. participation in the organization.

Another reason emerges from a consideration of the views expressed by high-ranking Government officials as well as by officials of the FAO and the World Food Council in interviews with a member of the committee staff. There is confusion among them about U.S. policy, goals and objectives. The following points emerged from these interviews.

1. The United States does not have a coherent policy toward FAO and has tried to undermine the organization. Examples of this undermining are U.S. backing of the creation of the World Food Council; the fact that the United States was instrumental in taking the issue of world food security (in which FAO had done pioneering work) to the International Wheat Council which effectively excluded FAO from any active role; and the curtailment of U.S. contributions to UNDP.

2. The United States accords FAO affairs a low priority.

3. U.S. influence in FAO, partially as a result of the lack of adequate representation of U.S. nationals in the Secretariat, has declined.

4. There is evidence of policy conflicts between USDA and the State Department. One FAO official noted that FAO is under the purview of a domestic agency, namely, the USDA. USDA's constituency is the American farmer and farm organizations. What is good for the American farmer is not necessarily good for the international food situation, according to this person. USDA lacks the international perspective that is necessary to deal with the world food crisis. For example, USDA does not want the Government to meddle in food trade, it is against food reserves, and it would rather sell than aid.

Many of these themes were echoed in interviews with U.S. officials. It is their perception that FAO is a low priority with concerned U.S. agencies. FAO does not have the attention (and perhaps does not deserve it) of top policymakers. There are differences and tensions between USDA, State and AID on FAO policy matters. A statement of objectives might end this confusion and clarify the degree of interest of the U.S. Government in FAO.

It is difficult to prepare a policy statement. One reason is that high-level policymakers are not sufficiently interested in FAO to set the process in motion and demand results. This belies the assertion that FAO is the paramount agency or the chosen instrument of U.S. Government policy in the field of agricultural cooperation and development. Another reason is that because the United States lacks an overall strategy in the international food field, it is difficult to derive a rational and meaningful policy for only one international organization in this field.

Yet another possibility is that those involved in the process are so close to the organization and so immersed in the generalized supportive policy consensus that they find it difficult, if not impossible, to

[32] Testimony of J. Kenneth Fasick, Director, International Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Participation," Mar. 5, 1976, p. 85.

step back and articulate specific policy objectives.[33] Finally, the differences between responsible executive branch agencies may be so great and the degree of Presidential leadership and concern in the area so small, that a policy of muddling through may be the only alternative.

Assistant Secretary Bell suggested another possibility at the March 5 hearing. He said FAO is changing and evolving so fast—as is the international context in which it operates—that it would be an essentially meaningless exercise to develop objectives which would soon have to be abandoned in the light of changed circumstances.[34]

At the same time, however, Dr. Phillips told the Select Committee that a working group of the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee had been at work for some time to revise and update the 1970 objectives document as a means of preparing for the July 1976 session of the FAO Council.[35] Against this backdrop and at the urging of Senator Percy, Assistant Secretary Bell agreed to send to the committee by May 1, a draft of a statement of U.S. policy toward FAO. This document is printed as an appendix of this study.*

Although it is an improvement over the 1970 paper, the new policy statement falls short of what is needed. It confuses rather than clarifies and settles for generalities where specifics are needed. Rather than setting out priorities the paper ratifies almost everything FAO is presently doing. It is impossible to tell from the document where primary U.S. interests lie. The authors seem satisfied with setting forth what seem to be desirable intentions rather than establishing objectives that can be analyzed and evaluated and toward which progress can be measured. Moreover, the statement does not define how the United States can achieve its objectives in FAO.

The staff recommends that the responsible Government officials write and obtain official approval of a statement of U.S. policy toward FAO which contains clear and precise objectives, goals, and priorities for the organization and for U.S. participation in the organization. This policy statement should be part of a coherent strategy which the United States seeks to pursue to fight world hunger and malnutrition through increased food production and related policies. The FAO policy statement should be used to guide the preparation of specific position papers as well as to guide those Americans who interact with the organization on a routine basis. Such a policy statement should be reviewed and updated annually and those responsible for U.S. participation in FAO should report to Congress on the success or failure of the United States in achieving its objectives.

2. Ways in Which the U.S. Participates in FAO

At the December hearing the Select Committee was told by the administration witnesses that the:

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[33] McKitterick, op. cit., passim, and Raymond F. Hopkins, "Global Food Management: U.S. Policy-Making in an Independent World" (paper prepared for the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy). Xeroxed, no date, both emphasize the existence of the "old-boys" network linking the FAO with the technicians of the Department of Agriculture. This is both a communications network and a mechanism for the support of the status quo.

[34] Bell, op. cit., p. 104.

[35] Testimony of Dr. Ralph W. Phillips, Director, International Organization Affairs, USDA. "U.S. Participation," op. cit., pp. 96, 98.

*See p. 69.

United States Government accords high priority to participation in FAO affairs at all levels—the governing bodies, the key committees of governing bodies, the consultation and meetings relating to the many aspects of food, agriculture, fisheries, and forestry to which FAO's program relate, and in the FAO regular and field staffs by the placement of competent United States Nationals therein.[36]

This section describe the ways in which U.S. representatives participate in the organization at various levels.

PARTICIPATION IN FAO FORA

The United States makes an earnest effort to participate in all the meetings sponsored by FAO each year. The International Organization Affairs Office in USDA told the committee that in each of the last 2 years the United States participated in 58 FAO-sponsored meetings, including those of the governing bodies, the key committees of the governing bodies on which governments are represented—the United States Government participates in five of these committees: Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, Commodity Problems, and the newly created Committee on World Food Security—and the range of consultations, working groups, seminars, and other fora which make up a major part of FAO's activities. This total does not include meetings of the Program and Finance Committees on which Americans sat in the last 2 years as private individuals. Additional figures supplied by USDA indicate that these meetings on the average required the attendance of four U.S. representatives for a period of 6 days or a total of 12,272 man hours.

At the last six regular biennial sessions of the FAO Conference, the U.S. delegate has been an assistant secretary—or the equivalent—on three occasions; a deputy assistant secretary on two occasions; and a "counselor or to the secretary" on one occasion. When the Secretary of Agriculture has been in Rome during a Conference, he has acted as *ex officio* head of the delegation. These delegates have always been officials of the Department of Agriculture.

At the last 20 sessions of the FAO Council, the U.S. delegate has been an Assistant Secretary on 6 occasions, a Deputy Assistant Secretary on 10 occasions (all but once the same individual), a counselor to the Secretary twice, an Administrator once and an Assistant Administrator once. On all but one occasion the delegate was from the Department of Agriculture. The only exception was a Council session in March 1975 when the U.S. delegate was a State Department official. Seven different individuals represented the United States at FAO Council meetings from 1967 to 1975.

P. L. Yates, a former FAO official, argued in 1955 that both the quality and rank of representatives sent to meetings were good indicators of the level of interest that governments attached to participation in FAO. "Governments must not rely overmuch on the Secretariat," he wrote.

The work is work by governments for governments, and its quality will depend on the quality of the men sent by governments to carry it out. For expert meetings, experts, not diplomates, are in order: for the FAO Council, the administrative head of at least one government department and, on occasion of special debates, even a minister; for the Conference, always a minister (and preferably

[36] Statement submitted for the record, "Report on the 18th Conference," op. cit., p. 45.

the minister for agriculture) plus one or two department heads and appropriate advisors.[37]

On the basis of this standard, it can be said that the participation of the United States in Conference and Council sessions is satisfactory.

The same can be said for what Yates calls "expert meetings:" the annual round of committee and subcommittee meetings, ad hoc consultations, working groups, seminars, and training sessions. Representation, as indicated by the official head of the U.S. delegation attending each meeting, was drawn from the following departments during 1974 and 1975: Agriculture (66 times in 2 years); State (11 times, including twice when the representative was a member of a mission or Embassy staff); Health, Education, and Welfare (15, primarily for meetings of the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Committee and Subcommittees); Commerce (8, primarily for meetings concerning fisheries); AID (5, usually meetings of the joint FAO/U.N. world food program); and Farm Credit Administration (1). Only once in 2 years was the United States represented by a person from outside the Government. He was a faculty member from Louisiana State University.

Representation in meetings other than those of the Conference and Council is seldom at a level higher than deputy assistant secretary. The representation is more generally from the ranks of senior level civil servants who are the directors or deputy directors of major line agencies within their respective departments.

Several years ago, Dr. Phillips commented about the makeup of U.S. delegations to FAO meetings. In an undated and unsigned internal working paper, he suggested that delegations were sometimes "overstaffed." He said many FAO technical meetings often had an importance which transcended the immediate agenda because of the impact of discussions on FAO's future programs of work and budget. Dr. Phillips suggested that more care be taken in naming delegations and limiting membership to those with specific tasks or competencies, as well as an understanding of the dynamics of the organization.[38] Officials of other departments concerned with FAO interpreted this suggestion as part of an effort to increase USDA's control over U.S. participation in the FAO. The working paper never received serious attention at the policymaking level, but its author says improvements have been made since 1971.

McKitterick suggests in his analysis of U.S. participation in U.N. development agencies that success in advancing policy rests on effective contacts with the Directors General and Secretariats of these organizations. "The key diplomat is the officially designated U.S. member of the agency board of directors or governing council," McKitterick states. He argues that it is this person's responsibility to develop a rapport with the Director General and his key subordinates. "He should discuss regularly and intimately with the Director General the whole range of U.S. interests, and particularly budget policy." [39]

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[37] P. L. Yates, "So Bold an Aim: 10 Years of International Cooperation Toward Freedom From Want" (Rome: privately printed, 1955), p. 152.

[38] Ralph W. Phillips, "Notes Regarding Improved Participation in FAO Affairs," duplicated, no date, pp. 2–3.

[39] McKitterick, op. cit., pp. 58–59.

U.S. participation in FAO does not meet this standard because the United States does not name a permanent delegate to the Council. The FAO's governing bodies, the Conference and the Council, meet biennially and semiannually, respectively. Day-to-day contacts with the FAO Secretariat are the responsibility of the FAO Liaison Office in the U.S. Embassy in Rome.

U.S. representation might be more effective if there were continuity in representation at Council sessions. But seven different individuals have represented the United States at Council sessions during the last 9 years.

An argument, however, can be made against continuity in representation. High-level U.S. policymakers have other duties and responsibilities which would prevent them from spending time on FAO activities. These officials might lack interest or confidence in the activities of the FAO.

Most importantly, having a permanent representative to the FAO Council means the United States runs the risk of having this individual co-opted by the FAO Secretariat. The value of bringing in new ideas and new perspectives on FAO operations and of avoiding a stagnant and uncritical representation is preferable to a close relationship between a U.S. representative to the FAO Council and the FAO Secretariat.

FODAG

The U.S.-FAO Mission in Rome (FODAG) has the responsibility to create or mobilize support for U.S. policies toward FAO by maintaining daily contacts with other FAO missions and with the FAO Secretariat. The U.S. Mission* is located in the U.S. Embassy, but is not under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador to Italy. The mission is made up of three men. The head of the mission has traditionally been a Foreign Service officer. He holds the rank of counselor, a position just below that of Ambassador within the diplomatic community.

The Counselor's deputy is also a Foreign Service officer. The third member of the mission is from the Agency for International Development (AID). The latter's responsibility is to monitor the World Food Program, a joint U.N./FAO activity.

USDA does not at present have a representative in Rome. The explanation for the absence of any USDA representation in the mission is the lack of funds. No one is opposed to USDA participation. Assistant Secretary Bell said at the March 5 hearing that he planned to begin discussions with his colleagues about adding a USDA person to the mission.[40]

The role of the U.S.-FAO mission, according to State Department officials, is diplomatic—to develop a consensus within the organization and among member governments in support of U.S. policy and to move the organization in accord with instructions from Washington. It is necessary for the mission to be headed by a Foreign Service officer skilled in diplomacy and intergovernmental negotiation. The counselor should know something about food and agriculture, the State Department concedes, but he must represent several U.S. agencies. His success or failure will be measured in diplomatic terms.

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*The official title is Office of U.S. Representative to FAO.

[40] Bell, op. cit., pp. 95–96.

The addition of a USDA person would add balance to the U.S. mission and improve day-to-day participation in the organization. Dr. Phillips said in 1971:

> The United States has been greatly handicapped in its planning for meetings, preparing for consideration of proposed programs of work, identifying upcoming vacancies, supporting technical candidates, evaluating FAO's substantive performance, and in other ways relating to our substantive participation in the Organization, owing to the lack of any subject-matter representation in the Embassy's FAO Liaison Office.[41]

Phillips also noted the need for more and better contact by the mission with member governments, particularly those with FAO missions in Rome.

Some Government officials suggest that an AID person familiar with agricultural issues should also be added. He or she could work effectively with FAO personnel, particularly those personnel in Rome who provide support for the field program, and focus on the development aspects of regular and field programs. This suggestion, however, has little support in either USDA or the State Department and does not have strong support at the policymaking level of AID.

The staff believes that the makeup of the U.S.-FAO mission should be reviewed in light of (1) the importance which the U.S. Government attaches to FAO and (2) the purposes or functions which it believes FAO can and should achieve. If FODAG is the primary link for day-to-day relations with FAO, if FAO is the leading agency in the international food field and if FAO's primary mission is to help developing nations in their development, then the makeup of the U.S. mission must be upgraded.

AGRICULTURAL ATTACHÉS

Agricultural attachés are stationed in U.S. embassies around the world. Although the major responsibility of the attaché is to promote world markets for U.S. products and to report agricultural information which might affect these markets to Washington, the agricultural attaché in Rome could provide a needed source of agricultural expertise for the U.S.-FAO mission. The GAO recently suggested that cooperation or increased contact with FAO could improve the performance of the agricultural attaché system in general.[42]

The agricultural attaché in Rome told GAO that his office had no "official contact" with FAO. One reason is that the mission views its role as concerned with "policy" and not "agricultural information."[43]

Another reason is that the agricultural attaché is accredited to the Italian Government and not to FAO. In order to work officially with FAO the attaché would have to be accredited as a representative to that organization. The attaché would then serve in more than one chain of command. This situation could threaten the harmonious functioning of the mission.

CONTACT WITH MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

One of the responsibilities of FODAG is to maintain contact with governments of FAO members through their missions in Rome. Con-

[41] Phillips, "Notes," op. cit., p. 5.
[42] "The Agricultural Attaché Role," op. cit., p. 46.
[43] Ibid., p. 41.

tact with member governments is a part of our participation. These contacts are important for the implementation of U.S. policy objectives and must be coordinated from Washington.

Besides contacts with permanent representatives in Rome, contacts with member governments are made through U.S. embassies in other capitals. The need to upgrade these contacts was noted in the 1971 Phillips paper.[44] The "Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Eighteenth Session of the FAO Conference" stressed the need with respect to countries serving on the Council.[45] The report also called for paying "special attention" to contacts with "developed countries through the mechanism of the Geneva Group".[46]

FIELD LEVEL COOPERATION

A form of participation with potentially great significance for achieving U.S. objectives is field level cooperation between AID and FAO personnel. Daniel Parker called cooperation at the field level "perhaps the most important of relationships between AID and FAO." [47] He described the relationship in these words:

> Our field missions, which are responsible for working directly with the host governments in the execution of A.I.D.'s programs maintain active liaison with the UNDP Resident Representatives, with the FAO officers who serve as agricultural advisors in most UNDP missions, and with representatives in the field of the World Food Program. The level and value of this liaison varies considerably from country-to-country depending on many factors, but is generally an important aspect of A.I.D. relationships with the FAO.[48]

Parker stressed the "wide range of practical cooperation that exists between the FAO and AID" in the field.[49] The activities of the two agencies appear to be compatible and complementary. For example, "In Nepal, FAO conducted a food consumption survey, and AID assisted the government to carry out a nutritional status survey. Both organizations have been consistent in urging the Nepalese to develop a nutrition plan based on the surveys." [50]

FAO and AID activities may be complementary, but they may also duplicate and overlap one another. They may even work at cross purposes.

This is possible because of the absence of a coherent worldwide strategy to combat hunger and malnutrition as well as the absence of a U.S. food policy which links together our bilateral and multilateral activities.

At the committee's March hearings Herbert Waters said that "our governmental bilateral development programs in the field do not have much relationship with FAO programs in the same country." [51] Whether or not the programs are coordinated, it is sufficient to note AID–FAO contacts in the field are another form of U.S. participation in FAO affairs.

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[44] Phillips, "Notes," op. cit., p. 6.
[45] "Official Report," op. cit., p. 56.
[46] Ibid. The Geneva Group is an informal alliance of the major donor countries of the U.N. system formed for consultation on matters, usually financial, of mutual concern. A subgroup of the Geneva Group exists in Rome.
[47] Parker, op. cit., p. 129.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid., p. 132.
[50] Ibid., p. 131.
[51] Waters, op. cit., p. 71.

Administrator Parker also indicated that his agency had indirect contacts with the FAO through other international organizations. These organizations are the United Nations development program (UNDP), the consultative group on international agricultural research (CGIAR), and the world food program (WFP). The existence of these indirect contacts underscores the existence of a food policy subsystem and the need for an integrated approach to policymaking in this country.

The March hearings also revealed that U.S. voluntary agencies, particularly those like Catholic relief services which give a high priority to food and nutrition activities, are having increased contact with international organizations such as FAO. These organizations, in turn, are beginning to work more closely with voluntary agencies in the developing nations in executing projects. This relationship, while not within the immediate jurisdiction and control of the United States, does pose a potential problem for officials charged with coordinating U.S. participation in FAO.

U.S. NATIONALS AND FAO

U.S. nationals participate in FAO as private individuals. Members of the Program and Finance Committee serve as private individuals. These individuals have a major impact on the policies of the organization and, on U.S. policy toward it. Dr. Phillips has been a member of the Program Committee for several years and is now serving his second 2-year term as Chairman. The fact that he is also the head of the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee, and plays a major role in designing, and implementing U.S. policy toward the FAO raises important questions. Is it possible for someone deeply involved in preparing the program of work and budget to assume a detached and objective point-of-view in helping to shape the U.S. Government's position on the document? Is it possible for him to divest himself of the attitudes and opinions which guided his behavior on the Program Committee in order to develop a governmentwide position consistent with U.S. policy and interests? Is he not more likely to defend the decisions and actions of the Program Committee than he is to encourage constructive criticism from his colleagues in the Government and to work for a consensus based on objective analysis of the program of work and budget? In short, does not a potential conflict of interest exist for persons holding these dual positions?

Because the potential exists, the staff recommends that in the future if U.S. citizens serve on the Program or Finance Committees as private individuals, then these individuals should not be assigned any policymaking responsibilities and should serve only as resource persons for those officials developing U.S. policy or position papers.

A final and extremely important form of participation, one singled out for emphasis in the comment from the administration quoted at the outset of this section, is that of U.S. nationals serving as members of the FAO regular and field staffs.

At the December hearing Senator Percy asked why the United States, which supplies 25 percent of FAO's regular budget, holds only about 10 percent of the staff positions, while the United Kingdom,

which provides only 6.77 percent of the budget, holds approximately the same proportion of positions. Senator Percy noted that placing talented Americans in FAO positions might increase the technical competence of the organization, better serve U.S. policy interests, and provide an additional source of information for Government officials.

The administration submitted the following information in response to Senator Percy's comments:

> The United States is definitely under-represented in FAO; and this has been of concern to the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture for many years. FAO does not allocate positions for specific nationalities. They have, however, established a desirable level of representation for all professional positions funded from the regular program budget. Under this arrangement, it has been determined that the United States should have approximately a 20 percent level of representation. As of September 30, 1975 we were at the 12.04 percent level. This percentage has been dropping for several years. * * *
>
> A considerable number of U.S. citizens are also employed by FAO under U.N. Development Program funds. In this program we have seen a sizeable increase in the number and the percentage of U.S. citizens employed. For example, the number of U.S. citizens increased from 140 to 184 during the period of December 31, 1971 to December 31, 1974. The corresponding percentages have increased from 7.49 percent to 9.57 percent.[52]

The number of Americans in top level policymaking positions has remained about the same over the years. Difficulties occur at middle or lower grades. Assistant Secretary Lewis described in March the reasons for the difficulty of recruiting and placing Americans in these positions:

> First, salaries within the FAO provide a much stronger inducement to nationals of other countries than to Americans. Neither is the FAO able to offer the career possibilities available to our people in government, universities, and other areas. Often the result is that we can recommend only persons who have completed their careers in one particular field and wish a second careers in FAO. Seldom are such persons interested in field assignments, so the employment field is narrowed to headquarters where turnover in personnel is obviously slower.[53]

Other reasons cited for the lack of Americans in FAO are the absence of suitable training and experience among younger people (including language proficiency), the desire of Americans to commit themselves only for short periods of time to the organization, lack of vigor by the agencies responsible for recruitment and placement of U.S. nationals in international organizations, and the length of time required to make appointments. The latter difficulty has been alleviated by recent changes in the stringent loyalty check procedures applied to potential U.S. nominees for FAO positions.

Another problem is the nonpermanent nature of FAO staff positions. Legislation was passed in 1958 to help provide an incentive to career civil servants who might not consider working for an international organization for fear of losing their rights and benefits. Congress provided reemployment rights (for up to 5 years with the permission of the agency and up to 8 years by authority of the Secretary of State) and protection of fringe benefits for those serving with an international organization.

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[52] Material submitted for the record, "Report on the 18th Session," p. 43. Assistant Secretary Lewis reported at the March 5 hearing that 148 Americans were employed by FAO as UNDP-funded experts in 1975, representing 8.50 percent of the total so employed. See Lewis, op. cit., p. 120.

[53] Lewis, ibid. One nongovernmental witness called this a conscious policy of using FAO as a dumping ground for unwanted U.S. Government employees.

In practice, the law has not had the intended effect. Agencies are understandably reluctant to keep posts vacant or to release valued employees for long periods of time; talented civil servants, in turn, are reluctant to leave the career stream and possibly forego opportunities to advance within the career service.[54]

The same problem exists for qualified persons from the academic world. Universities dislike releasing faculty members for periods longer than a year; faculty members do not want to give up tenured positions or interrupt satisfying research and teaching activities for service with FAO or any other international organizations.

The staff recommends that the Senate Government Operations Committee carefully examine alternative ways of providing additional incentives to employees and employers alike inside of government and out in order to attract qualified Americans for service in international organizations in general and FAO in particular.

The staff also recommends that the State Department and the Department of Agriculture immediately review their respective efforts to recruit and place talented American citizens in FAO positions at all levels. A new and intensive recruitment effort should be launched with the objective of achieving as soon as possible the level of representation set for the United States.

The United States should also make better use of the associate expert program which allows qualified young people to serve for short periods of time at the beginning of their careers with an international organization. Salaries are paid by the home country, but the men and women work for the international agency. European countries which have large associate expert programs find that many of these young people eventually become permanent employees of an organization such as FAO.

At the present time a few AID personnel, particularly in Africa, function as U.S. associate experts. AID assistance funds pay their salaries. A full-scale U.S. associate expert program has been discussed from time to time in the administration and has apparently been endorsed by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and USDA's Office of International Organization Affairs, but to date a program has not materialized.

The staff recommends that the administration establish immediately a U.S. associate experts program. No better way exists for attracting qualified young Americans for service with FAO and other international organizations.

3. U.S. Policymaking Machinery

Responsibility for making and implementing policy

Responsibility for U.S. participation in FAO rests finally with the President of the United States. It is doubtful, however, if at any time in the last 30 years an incumbent President has actively participated in FAO policymaking.

[54] Civil servants or foreign service officers who have been "seconded" to international organizations have often been passed over for promotions which, if they had been in their regular positions, they would have received. An indication that this practice is on the wane is that one of the persons on a recent foreign service promotion list is currently serving with FAO. This promotion should be precedent for additional ones in the future.

The General Accounting Office, in its 1969 study of U.S. financial participation in FAO, listed six officials as "primarily responsible for administration of U.S. financial participation" in the organization: the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the Counselor for FAO Affairs in Rome.

In a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture dated March 30, 1946, President Truman directed the Secretary "to take the leadership in coordinating the work of the various agencies of the Government on problems arising from U.S. participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization." This designation is still in effect, but the question of final responsibility is complicated by the 1966 Presidential memorandum cited in the previous section directing the Secretary of State to assume the leadership role for all international organizations.

The Truman directives of 1946 have traditionally been interpreted "not to preclude the responsibility of the Secretary of State for policy guidance on international political questions and on general organizational and administrative questions as they affect the relationships of the Food and Agriculture Organization and other international organizations: nor do they preclude the Secretary of State's responsibility for designating official U.S. Government representation at FAO conferences, council sessions, and other meetings." [55]

The GAO representative at the March 5 hearing said that "there is confusion within the bureaucracy as to who is in charge." J. Kenneth Fasick noted: "The Secretary of Agriculture is officially supposed to be the key person in the executive branch in relationship to the FAO operations. On the other hand, he is subject to the State Department, the Secretary of State's overall guidance in this area." [56]

When asked by Senator Percy to tell the committee who had the responsibility and authority to resolve interagency or interdepartmental disputes about U.S. policy toward FAO, the Department of Agriculture witnesses at the March 5 hearing passed the buck to the Department of State. Dr. Phillips told the committee:

> Now, since our participation in FAO and other international organizations is an international or foreign relations activity, if there is a difference of opinion, the final decision has to come down to the Secretary of State, or his representative. The Department of Agriculture likes to have a major input in what these points of views are, since it is agriculture, but it is foreign affairs, so in the final analysis, that is where the buck stops.[57]

Interestingly enough, Assistant Secretary Lewis did not want to accept the responsibility and attempted to pass the buck back to USDA.

> It is clear that the buck really stops in the executive branch on only one desk, and there are a lot of white pillars in front of his house.
>
> But it is also true, I am told, that an Executive order signed many years ago by a previous President, clearly gives the lead responsibility to the Department of Agriculture on FAO matters.

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[55] "U.S. FAO Interagency Committee," International Organization Affairs, Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, duplicated, July 1975, p. 1.
[56] Fasick, op. cit., p. 85.
[57] Phillips, "U.S. Participation," op. cit., p. 98.

Now that does not, however, change the fact that the State Department is responsible for all of our participation in all international organizations, coordinating it, and making sure that it reflects administration policy.

In that sense the buck stops on my desk as an intermediate layer. So it is a little hard to answer your question.

I am rather curious, incidentially, if the buck stops on the Secretary of State's desk; why Mr. Bell and Dr. Phillips chair the (FAO) Interagency Committee?

Clearly that is an inconsistency in itself. So I have to assume the Executive order which gives Mr. Bell that responsibility, derivative from the Secretary of Agriculture, demonstrates that Agriculture is the prime agency on FAO matters.[58]

STATE AND USDA: SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES

No one official is in charge of making U.S. policy toward FAO and no one official manages all phases of U.S. participation in the organization. The Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, and AID do, however, have important policymaking roles. Day-to-day management or coordinating activities are divided between the Agriculture Directorate in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in the Department of State and the Office of International Organization Affairs in the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture.

The Agriculture Directorate has a three-person professional staff which devotes the overwhelming proportion of its time to FAO. According to the Government Operations Manual, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the functional directorates into which it is divided, are supposed to coordinate and provide policy guidance and support for participation in the activities of international organizations. Having functional responsibility for an organization in one office or "Directorate" is supposed to improve liaison with other government agencies and thereby promote effective U.S. participation. McKitterick compares the functions of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to those of a watchdog or a budget bureau. Programmatic or substantive responsibilities, he says, remain with the relevant domestic departments.[59] In general, the State Department handles "political" questions and the Department of Agriculture (in the cases of the FAO) substantive matters. "In practice," according to McKitterick:

> the division is neither neat nor efficient. The Department of State is perpetually bogged down in political "crises," cumbersome and endless conference preparations, and detailed accounting problems, at the expense of the strategic controls on which it should be concentrating. The domestic departments, for their part, are ill-equipped to conduct effective diplomacy, and they have developed a proprietary interest in the technical or "collegiate" activities of the U.N. agencies as against the development activities in which they have little or no interest.[60]

The Bureau of International Organization Affairs was described in the Murphy Commission report on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy as "characterized by inadequate staffing, limited influence, highly mechanical responsibilities, and a relatively small policy role." [61]

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[58] Lewis, op. cit., pp. 116–117.
[59] McKitterick, op. cit., p. 55.
[60] Ibid.
[61] "Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., June 1975, p. 131.

Responsibility for the Department of Agriculture's FAO-related activities is in an office staffed by four professionals located in the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS).

The Government Organization Manual indicates that the FAS is concerned primarily with promoting U.S. agricultural exports. It does this through various means including conducting foreign commodity analysis, operating a worldwide reporting and analysis network through the system of agricultural attachés, and improving access to foreign markets. In performing this task, the FAS works through international organizations such as FAO "to reduce international trade barriers, increase world trade in agricultural products, and further trade policies advantageous to U.S. agriculture." [62]

The manual notes that "FAS also coordinates the Department's participation in international organizations and in international conferences and meetings for consideration of policy and operating programs." Particular attention, it is said, is given to the FAO.[63]

It is difficult to understand why the Office of International Organization Affairs is a part of an agency whose primary activity is to run the agricultural attaché system. The attachés do not help this Office to perform its duties or vice versa. Little contact exists between FAO and FAS's agricultural attachés. The Department of Agriculture told the GAO that its attachés found it "difficult to take full advantage of the available FAO resources and information because Agriculture was not responsible for U.S. Government liaison with that organization." [64]

U.S.-FAO INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE

Participation in an international organization such as the FAO involves a number of Government departments and agencies. The need for a coordinating body was obvious from the moment the United States became a member of the organization. President Truman's letter of March 30, 1946, also established an interagency committee, known today as the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee, to be chaired by the Secretary of Agriculture, or his nominee, and charged it with "responsibility for insuring that our Government aids to the fullest extent the proper functioning of the FAO." [65]

It is likely that the establishment of this committee was in part a response to Lord Boyd Orr, FAO's first Director General, who urged all member countries to establish "national FAO committees, made up of representatives of all the Government agencies with which the Food and Agriculture Organization deals and in some cases, including as advisers, representatives of nongovernmental agencies interested in FAO-farm organizations, women's organizations, labor unions, re-

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[62] "U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1975–76." Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, D.C., p. 115.

[63] Ibid.

[64] "The Role of the Agricultural Attaché," op. cit., p. 45.

[65] "U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee," op. cit. The terms of reference for the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee have been elaborated from time to time and today read as follows:

"To coordinate the work of the various agencies of the Government on problems arising from U.S. participation in FAO; to insure that the U.S. Government aids to the fullest extent the proper functioning of FAO; to assist in formulating the positions which the U.S. Government should take in the various fields of activity falling within the general purposes and functions of FAO; and to provide a suitable channel for the speedy exchange of communications between FAO and the United States."

ligious groups, and so on." [66] This describes the makeup of the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee.

The committee is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs. At present this is Richard E. Bell. The vice chairman is Dr. Ralph Phillips, Director, International Organization Affairs, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture. The Office of International Organization Affairs services the committee.

Representatives of the following 10 major units of the executive branch serve on the committee: Agriculture (12 different agencies); Commerce; Defense; Health, Education, and Welfare; Interior; Labor; Office of Management and Budget; State; Agency for International Development; and Treasury. In addition, "advisers" from the following nongovernmental organizations serve on the committee: American Farm Bureau Federation, National Grange, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, National Farmers Union, Agricultural Missions, Inc., American Home Economics Association, National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, National Canners Association/Fishery Products Program, National Fisheries Institute, Society of American Foresters, and the American Forestry Association. (The two fishery organizations serve in alternate years.)

The committee staff has concluded that the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee is not a factor in developing, approving, or implementing U.S. policy toward FAO or in coordinating U.S. participation in the organization.

The Select Committee was told by USDA that in the 12 months preceding its hearing of December 15, 1975, the Interagency Committee met twice, in December 1974 and July 1975. Thirty-six persons attended the December meeting; 33 the July one. The chairman of the committee did not attend either of these meetings. The vice chairman attended both. Of the 21 members of the committee, 2 attended the July meeting and 3 attended the December one. Of the 37 alternates (and each member is supported by 1 to 5 alternates), 14 attended the December meeting and 11 attended the July one. In other words, less than half of those who attended the July and December meetings were actually members of the Interagency Agency Committee (13 of 33 in July; 17 of 36 in December).

Of the 33 people who actually attended the July meeting, 22 were from USDA, 4 from the State Department, and 1 each from Labor, HEW, Treasury, and AID. One nongovernmental representative, a representative of the American Home Economics Association, attended the July meeting; none attended the December meeting which followed much the same pattern otherwise. Of the 36 attendees in December, 20 were from USDA, 5 from State, 2 from AID, 4 from Commerce, 2 from HEW, and 1 from Labor.

All of the persons named as nongovernmental advisers of the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee were invited to testify at the Select Committee's hearings. William E. Towell, executive vice president of the American Forestry Association, replied that, "It came as news to me . . . that I have been designated a nongovernmental adviser to

[66] Gove Hambidge, "The Story of FAO" (New York: Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1955), p. 78.

the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee." [67] A similar oral communication was received from a staff person of the National Grange speaking on behalf of that organization's nongovernmental adviser to the committee.

Only 2 of the 11 organizations sent representatives to testify at the March hearings—the American Home Economics Association and Agricultural Missions, Inc. Two others, the American Farm Bureau Federation and the Society of American Foresters, provided statements for the record. The National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, indicated it would file a statement, but none has been received.

The nongovernmental advisers do not attach much importance to their "membership" on the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee. Benton Rhoades, executive director of Agricultural Missions, Inc., explained why at the hearing of March 4:

> There were a number of years when I did attend the Committee and at one time, several years ago, I felt that it needed to be reorganized.
>
> A considerable amount of time of the committee was spent in naming who would represent them at the various meetings rather than on developing positions for our own representatives at those meetings.
>
> For that reason, frankly at the time I decided that it was not a high priority in our staff work.
>
> I feel at this time and partially as a result of this hearing, that we should give higher priority to involvement in that committee, and admit that we have not in recent years probably to our own loss.[68]

Dr. Phillips recognized that a problem existed when he wrote his 1971 paper about improved U.S. participation in FAO. He said:

> The U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee has ten nongovernmental advisers (two fishery groups alternate membership on a yearly basis), drawn from as many farm, forestry, home economic, religious and Land-Grant-College organizations. At one stage the representatives of most of these organizations were very active in the Committee, and nominations of six (and at an earlier stage eight) of them were regularly included in Delegations to FAO Conference. With the shrinkage of OIC (Office of International Conferences) funds that practice has been almost entirely discontinued. Finding themselves unable to keep in touch through Conference participation, unhappy with the manner in which NARO was operated for many years, disillusioned with Mr. Sen's approach to the administering of FAO affairs, finding themselves—in the case of the farm organizations—heavily involved in domestic affairs, and perhaps for other reasons, the interest of these organizations in FAO affairs has gradually diminished. Currently, only the adviser from the Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges maintains a regular, active role.[69]

While stressing the need for advice from private organizations Dr. Phillips did not suggest any alternative ways of achieving the objective. Participation of nongovernmental organizations in U.S. policymaking for FAO is nonexistent.

According to a letter from Assistant Secretary Bell to Senator Percy, the function of the FAO Interagency Committee is to coordinate U.S. participation in FAO affairs and to serve as a means of exchanging information and views. "The committee," Mr. Bell said,

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[67] Letter from William E. Towell to Senator George McGovern, reprinted in "U.S. Participation," op. cit., Mar. 4, 1976, p. 3.
[68] Testimony of Benton Rhoades, "U.S. Participation," ibid., pp. 44–45.
[69] Phillips, "Notes," op. cit., pp. 9–10.

"is basically a coordinating and not a decisionmakng body." [70] He modified this statement somewhat in his testimony before the Select Committee in March: "I think, Mr. Chairman, that this FAO Interagency Committee is more than just a coordinating body, and that it does make decisions about what we are going to be working on, who is going to work on it, when they must prepare their position papers, and how it will be cleared." [71]

The Committee as a committee does not set and implement policy. It does perform routine housekeeping functions. If the Committee does not, as Dr. Phillips says, have an "executive function," and is not a decisionmaking body, then where does the authority lie? "The basic authority," according to Secretary Bell's letter,

> remains with the Executive Branch Departments and/or Agencies responsible for specific functions. Subject-matter-wise, the inputs of the various Agencies and Departments are made through the Working Groups which prepare Position Papers, propose the composition of Delegations, and carry out other tasks as necessary. Position papers, nominations of Delegations, etc. are consolidated in the Department of Agriculture, and forwarded to the Department of State for final concurrence and action. In this context, the main decisionmaking function of the Interagency Committee as such is the appointment of *ad hoc* Working Groups, the members of which then take the necessary actions on behalf of their respective Agencies and Departments.[72]

Three important points emerge from this letter. Decisions are made or policy set on a issue-specific basis, in reaction, more often than not, to an agenda set or an action taken elsewhere. Real policymaking power remains in the hands of the individual Government departments and agencies that have an interest in the specific function, activity, or program of FAO. This usually means the Department of Agriculture. Finally, the work of the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee is accomplished through working groups.

HOW THE FAO INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE FUNCTIONS

All concerned with the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee acknowledge that most of what the committee does is carried out through ad hoc working groups. These are set up to prepare for meetings and to carry out other specific tasks as required. They are terminated as soon as their tasks are completed. The staff in the office of the chairman and members of working groups, as well as the chairman and members themselves, contribute substantially to the staffing of the working groups, preparing all necessary position papers and documents.

For example, a working group under Dr. Phillips was charged with preparation for the Council and Conference sessions of 1975. There were 19 members of this working group representing USDA—12 persons, including the chairman—State, 3; AID, 1; OMB, 1; Treasury, 1; and Commerce 1. Of the 19, 4 were members of the Interagency Committee, 10 were alternates, and 2 were staff from the office of International Organization Affairs; the others were unrelated to the committee.

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[70] Letter to Senator Charles H. Percy from Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Richard E. Bell, Dec. 11, 1975, with attachments.
[71] Bell, op. cit., p. 98.
[72] Richard E. Bell to Senator Charles H. Percy, Dec. 11, 1975.

Preparations for the 18th Session of the Conference began in earnest on August 8, when Dr. Phillips circulated a memo concerning the November Conference. On August 25, a meeting was held at which assignments were made. These assignments were confirmed on August 27, and deadlines were established for a first draft of a position paper, October 6, and a final draft October 24. Most of the writers consulted informally with others associated with the working group or with the Interagency Committee. Documentation from FAO was used as received. Some reached Washington in midsummer; substantial amounts did not arrive until much later.

Fourteen individuals were responsible for drafting the 47 position papers prepared for the Conference. Six of these individuals were not members of the working group. Of these six, three were alternate members of the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee and two others were associated with the Agriculture Directorate of the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

It was Agriculture Directorate which bore the greatest burden. Four members of this bureau prepared 33 position papers on such subjects as procedural issues, relations with other international organizations, composition of the governing bodies and committees, and various bookkeeping and internal administrative issues. This work is consistent with the stated role of the State Department.

Of the remaining 14 position papers, the Commerce Department prepared 1, AID prepared 1, and USDA the remainder. Staff of the office on International Organization Affairs were responsible for five papers.

After position papers are drafted, they are reviewed and cleared by personnel of concerned agencies. Some papers for the 18th session were cleared by as many as eight persons; one had no clearance. A total of 31 people were involved in providing clearances; 20 of these were involved only in this aspect of the preparations and did not in addition draft one or more position papers. Of this latter group, six were members of the working group; of those who were not, four were members or alternates of the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee. Those providing clearances but not writing papers were from USDA, 9; State, 2; AID, 8; and Treasury, 1.

In short, 20 persons involved in drafting and/or clearing position papers were not members of the working group. Thirteen of these persons had no official connection with the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee. Three members of the working group neither drafted nor cleared any paper. One of these was the secretary of the delegation.

These data suggest that the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee and its ad hoc working group charged with responsibility for preparing for the 18th session of the Conference are paper structures. The process of preparing for a Conference, or setting policy and making decisions, is much more fluid and chaotic than the existence of the committee and its working groups would suggest.

The December hearing brought out some of the problems in the existing process. Senator Percy asked Dr. Don Paarlberg, U.S. Representative to the 18th session of the Conference, and his associates, to describe the way in which the United States developed its position on a specific agenda item, namely, on the level of the proposed budget for the 1976–77 biennium. The following exchange took place:

Senator PERCY. First, who drafted the U.S. position on the budget item?

Dr. PAARLBERG. We had a task force and Dr. Phillips was the chairman of it. And there was participation from all the concerned agencies.

I think, Ralph, if you could just capsule in a few sentences the amount of time and the amount of effort that went into developing our position.

Senator PERCY. You might start, Dr. Phillips, by just describing how many agencies participated in developing the budget position. And you served as chairman of that group, is that right?

Dr. PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, this has to be looked at, I think, in terms of the program of work content, on the one hand, and the actual position on the budget level on the other, because as you are well aware, the input into FAO's budget in support of the regular program of work is in the Department of State's budget, so they in the final analysis have to face up to that problem.

So in fact the working group which was set up by the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee, of which I was chairman, included all of those agencies that indicated their interest, and I think there were about eight or nine of them.

Senator PERCY. Could you name the agencies?

Dr. PHILLIPS. Those included were the Agricultural Research Service, Forest Service, Economic Research Service, of the Department of Agriculture; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the Department of Commerce; and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and AID, of the Department of State.

The bulk of the work, of course, on the content of the program was done in the Department of Agriculture where most of the work falls except for the fishery work. That part of the paper was put together in my office, with the inputs from the various members of the working group.

Senator PERCY. You met with representatives from the various agencies, but who had the responsibility for final clearance on the budget item?

Were they able to do it sitting in a room, or did it go up through the agencies? In State for instance where did that final clearance come from?

Dr. PHILLIPS. As I mentioned earlier, the final responsibility for this is in the Department of State. The same is true of what might be called the final formal clearance of all position papers.

They may be drafted and usually are drafted by a working group which involves departments, depending on the interest in a subject matter item, but in the final analysis those papers go to the Department of State for the final policy clearance thereon.[73]

Senator Percy asked the witnesses to reveal any difficulties which the U.S. Government had in developing a position on the budget item. Dr. Roy Morey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, revealed that even though a position paper was drafted based on an analysis of the Director General's "program of work and budget," a final decision on a U.S. position was put off until the Conference got underway in Rome. Dr. Morey said this was done in part to allow for consultations with the Geneva group, an informal group of the major donors of the U.N. system. A subgroup of the Geneva group exists in Rome. Other witnesses indicated that the United States had been at work for a year prior to the 18th Session of the Conference to reduce the level of proposed budget. And in fact it was reduced from about $185 million to about $167 million.

Senator PERCY. I am a little concerned when the United States appears to waffle. The U.S. Delegation position paper stated the delegation may support the adopton of a draft resolution which would provide an effective working budget on the order of $167 million, but then on November 17, the day that Commission 2 considered the item, the U.S. delegation stated it did not have the authority to support the budget level.[74]

Then on November 21, the U.S. delegation was instructed apparently to reluctantly support the budget level.

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[73] "A Report on the Eighteenth Session on the Conference," pp. 26–27.

[74] As noted in the previous section of this report, the Delegation was instructed after arriving in Rome to press for a $10 million reduction in the proposed budget for the 1976–77 biennium.

I just wonder what went on there and why we looked like we were so ambivalent about something as important as the budget?

Couldn't we make our minds up?

Dr. MOREY. No, I think we did make our minds up, Senator, and the position that we had was that we should make an effort to determine whether or not there would be support from the major donors for some reduction in the overall budget figure. We originally made that contact in the Geneva Group meetings. We then had consultations with various countries, primarily the major donors through the Council sessions. What we found was that before the end of the Conference there was no country that was willing to make a reduction in the budget.

We had the opportunity at that time to determine whether we should vote against the budget, to abstain, or vote in favor of it.[75]

Senator Percy stressed the usefulness of taking a strong position. "It seems the delegation went there in a somewhat weakened position," he said. "If your instructions are you may support it, then you may, but then you may not also, I suppose. You are kind of caught betwixt and between." [76] He suggested that taking a firmer position on the reduction of the budget may yield more success than was achieved at the 18th session.

This discussion illustrates the complexity of policymaking with respect to FAO. It also illustrates that in spite of the existence of working groups, position papers, and the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee, the decision on the budget level was reached outside the formal structure of the decisionmaking process.

Senator Percy questioned Dr. Paarlberg about "unresolved problems" that existed on the eve of the delegation's departure for Rome.

Senator PERCY. (W)hat agenda items still remained unresolved just before your departure for Rome?

Dr. PAARLBERG. The position papers had by that time been prepared and circulated. There were a few, however, that had been delayed and were not yet in hand.

Senator PERCY. Could you name all those items for which you didn't have a clear-cut policy decision on that Friday (before departure for Rome)?

Dr. PAARLBERG. There was some uncertainty raised in that meeting about the U.S. policy with regard to research.

There was some question as to our policy with regard to nutrition. There were some questions with respect to our policy on women in development.

There had been position papers prepared on all of these issues, and we thought that these had been agreed on, but it developed in the meeting that there were still some questions.

So we had a discussion that ran for an hour or more on these issues. And we had further discussions on these points in our delegation when we got to Rome.

Senator PERCY. Why does it happen that just before you leave for a conference you still have an unclear policy on a couple of major items?

Why does this occur? Does it cause problems for you and your entire delegation?

Dr. PAARLBERG. I don't think it is unusual, Senator, that on the brink of some important meeting that there are major questions still to be resolved.

I think that there is some merit in the fact that this thing is not all completely laid on by the bureaucracy and that it is placed beyond any point of questioning.

I think it is a healthy indication that major issues can be addressed, even when we are on the brink of departure. And even when we are meeting in Rome, the morning before a discussion comes along, that it may be that something has emerged here that had not been foreseen, maybe something is lifted up by some other country that the people who prepared our position paper were not aware of, and there should be some flexibility in this business.

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[75] "A Report on the 18th Session of the Conference," op. cit., pp. 29–30.

[76] Ibid., p. 31.

I don't think this is necessarily bad. Now the particular issues, you asked me to be frank and I will be, had to do in part with views regarding research—this was one thing.

The Agency for International Development—and I will invite, if you agree, Mr. Farrar to comment on this—they have their view of how research should be done and this works quite well, I believe, in AID, but it is somewhat different in emphasis and tone from what the view of research is as it emerges in the FAO.

And the AID people were interested in pushing their views as to how the research should be carried forward. And so we had some disagreement about that, which we eventually resolved.

There were similar disagreements as I have said about our address to the question of nutrition and about our address to the question of women in rural development. But these were, I believe, satisfactorily resolved by airing them, and providing discussion of them in the meeting just prior to departure, and then by further discussion in Rome, perhaps not to the full satisfaction of all the parties, but in a fashion that permitted a consensus position to develop, and which position, when laid before the FAO Conference, was on the whole well received by that body.[77]

Differences which existed between USDA and AID about aspects of FAO's program were noted previously. The point to be made here is that the failure to resolve these differences—whether it be because of a failure on the part of FAO to supply the necessary documentation (as suggested by Dr. Phillips) or a failure of agencies to communicate and resolve differences in a timely fashion here in Washington (a failure acknowledged by Dr. Phillips)—reduce the effectiveness of the U.S. delegation to a meeting such as the FAO Conference. What McKitterick noted in 1965 seems to apply with greater force today:

Despite some of the hoariest departmental committees in Washington (e.g., the 50-odd member Interagency Committee for FAO) which are supposed to "coordinate" U.S. policy, U.S. delegations at the conferences of the specialized agencies more often than not speak with many voices and negotiate among themselves quite as much as with other delegations or with the secretariats of the agencies. It is difficult to exaggerate the amount of energy and of potential U.S. influence which is dissipated in this way before actual diplomatic conversation and negotiations are even begun.[78]

Flexibility is needed in order to respond to changing circumstances and unanticipated events at an international meeting. But flexibility that comes from having no position beforehand is a flexibility which yields no advantages. Regardless of whether or not the U.S. delegation sets forth a clear, unequivocal position upon which there is unity when it actually does speak, if, as Senator Percy said, the delegation is scratching together its statement up to the very last moment, it will not be able to shape events, but only respond to them.

Those nearest to the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee think it is a useful structure. Dr. Phillips said in his 1971 paper that the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee "is probably the most effective single mechanism in the U.S. Government for planning and preparing for the meetings convened by an international organization, and for otherwise coordinating our participation in FAO affairs."[79] Dr. Phillips noted in the same paper, however, that individuals and agencies operated outside of the Committee and that the nongovernmental advisers were no longer active in it. He also acknowledged at the March hear-

[77] Ibid., pp. 32–33.
[78] McKitterick, op. cit., p. 56.
[79] Phillips, "Notes," op. cit., p. 1.

ings, at least by omission, that U.S. participation in the FAO—a participation which, as shown in the last section, takes many different forms—is not coordinated or managed by the Committee.[80]

The 1973 State Department paper entitled "The Determination of United States Objectives in the Food and Agriculture Organization," notes that improving U.S. participation in the FAO is "a subject of continuing interest, rancor and little action." The paper contained several suggestions about the work of the Interagency Committee.[81] "The Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Eighteenth Session of the FAO Conference" suggests, albeit indirectly, that the Committee is not functioning effectively and efficiently in preparing for meetings. The Report states that

> It is . . . essential that all officers concerned with preparations for meetings and other activities, through Working Groups or other mechanisms set up by the U.S. FAO Interagency Committee, should strive assiduously to ensure that they carry out their responsibilities effectively and within established deadlines.[82]

AD HOC INTERAGENCY BARGAINING: HOW POLICY IS MADE

The U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee is not a major force in policymaking or decisionmaking regarding the FAO. The actual process, which is one of ad hoc bargaining among interested agencies on an issue-specific basis, does revolve in a vague and indefinite way around the committee structure. Given the problems of preparing for Eighteenth Conference, this informal bargaining process is not completely effective in developing policy or resolving disagreements.

Basic decisionmaking authority resides in the agencies from which participants in the bargaining process are drawn. Each of these agencies is primarily concerned with promoting and protecting the interests of its constituency. Moreover, when policy conflicts emerge among these participants, most of whom are mid-level career civil servants with some technical expertise, they cannot themselves resolve the conflicts. They lack final authority to speak for their respective agencies.

Mr. Bell noted "some constraints" which limit the effectiveness of this interagency collaborative process. Besides the absence of a USDA person in the U.S.-FAO Mission in Rome, Mr. Bell mentioned the lack of personnel working full time on FAO matters, the lack of any change in the number of personnel working in this area over the years despite tremendous growth in FAO's budget and program of work, and the limited contact with or understanding of FAO by many who must draft position papers.[83]

Earlier this year at a hearing of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey was told that after the World Food Conference the United States "focused more intensively" on and "strengthened" participation in FAO "and other relevant U.N. groups." Senator Percy therefor asked Dr. Phillips, "Has there been an increase in resources expanded, in personnel allocated, and the upgrading of our permanent mission to the FAO in Rome and

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[80] Phillips, "U.S. Participation," op. cit., pp. 99–100.
[81] "The Determination of United States Objectives," op. cit., p. 35.
[82] "Official Report," op. cit., pp. 56–57.
[83] Bell, op. cit., pp. 107–108.

so forth?" Dr. Phillips' response echoes Mr. Bell's statement about constraints on collaboration:

> I don't believe there has been any major change, Mr. Chairman, in the resources allocated. It is still essentially the same staff, both within the Department of Agriculture and of course the other departments can speak for themselves. But as I understand it, there has been no major change in their resources either in Washington or in the mission that is located in Rome.
>
> There has, however, been a substantial increase in the interest and intensity of preparations of positions, preparation of points of view on many issues over the last 18 months, and particularly over the last 6 months.[84]

Given not only the growth of the organization over the last decade or so, but also the persistence of the world food crisis and of the U.S. commitment to do something about it, and given that the United States supposedly sees FAO as its chosen instrument for agricultural cooperation and development, it seems inappropriate that the United States is devoting no additional personnel or resources to participation in the organization today than it did many years ago. U.S. policymaking cannot help but be hampered by the number of personnel who work regularly on FAO affairs as well as the grade level of those who do. As Joseph Marion Jones has noted:

> . . . a great deal would be gained if the advanced countries were to consider the work, the needs, and the opportunities of FAO at a higher level and in greater perspective. The officials in member countries who deal with FAO affairs are few and most of them operate at medium levels. They constitute the FAO family, and they are remarkably possessive about the Organization, and ingrown. They are often so close to operations that they fail to see the woods for the trees.[85]

The failure of the United States to keep its operating procedures consistent with FAO's evolving role and the resulting constraints on U.S. participation in the organization may explain why our policy is reactive and issue specific. This situation may also explain why the United States lacks meaningful objectives for the organization and why the United States seems unable to place FAO within the context of an overall strategy for combating worldwide hunger and malnutrition.

The peculiarities of the ad hoc policymaking process are evident when considering the participation of the Agency for International Development in this process.

In his testimony before the Select Committee, Administrator Parker noted the compatibility of the functions of his Agency and FAO.

> There can be no doubt that in its efforts to promote food production and consumption in the poor countries, FAO is serving to further the same policy interest that is clearly laid out by the Congress in the authorizing legislation for my Agency. The regular FAO budget does not serve this purpose directly; rather it provides the administrative planning and technical inputs without which direct activities in the LDCs would not be possible.[86]

A nongovernmental witness, Herbert Waters, president of the American Freedom for Hunger Foundation, noted this similarity in goals and functions, and went on to point out AID's limited participation in FAO policymaking in this country.

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[84] Phillips, "U.S. Participation" op. cit., p. 95.
[85] Jones, op. cit., p. 153.
[86] Parker, op. cit., p. 132.

The Agency for International Development was originally created to carry out this country's development objectives. Congress, in authorizing development funds, has given a mandate to the Agency for International Development to give its highest priority to food and agriculture development and improved nutrition. Yet the Agency for International Development is far from the focal point of our policy-making for FAO, and even further from any effective administrative liaison with FAO. In fact, the Agency for International Development has abolished the FAO liaison post it formerly had in the Office of the Agriculture Services in its Technical Assistance Bureau.[87]

Waters suggested that while the United States has encouraged FAO's evolution into a development assistance agency, it has not adapted to this change in FAO's character itself.

Key AID personnel, both on the agricultural and nutritional technical assistance staffs and in the regional bureaus, do not have any effective means for contact with the FAO. Mr. Waters said:

We can only conclude that the Agency for International Development has a far greater stake and continuing interest in FAO and its objectives than is now reflected by the level of interest taken by AID in its activities, or the degree of influence permitted AID in formulation of U.S. policies toward FAO.[88]

Mr. Parker acknowledged AID's interest in FAO matters as well as the fact that AID's participation in the FAO Interagency Committee and its relations with FAO tend to be "on a specific basis." In general, AID is limited to input on FAO's field program, and to a lesser extent, on research, nutrition, and development-related women's issues.

Mr. Parker put part of the blame for AID's position on the Congress. He said:

As to shaping FAO policy, or U.S. policy toward the FAO, I must say that we have certain constraints within AID. Your colleague committees have been pointedly interested in our operating expenses, our levels of employment, and were we to take a more assertive role, I would say that we would probably have to gear up and add some people to do this.[89]

The United States acts as if FAO had not changed since 1945. The U.S. policymaking apparatus has not adapted to FAO's changing role or to its growth in size and financial resources. The United States appears to be operating with the same number of personnel and the same procedures which existed 20 or even 30 years ago. As a result, policy is made by means of an ad hoc bargaining process involving bargaining among medium-level civil servants from the Department of Agriculture and the State Department, who are powerless to resolve conflicts which may arise. Differences must be brought to a higher level for resolution. Bargaining then takes place between policymakers one or two levels removed from the top of the departmental hierarchies.

Although it is unclear who has final authority and responsibility to resolve differences, it is apparent that most disputes are resolved in favor of the Department of Agriculture. This is true in part because the personnel at the highest levels of USDA are more likely to be interested in and aware of FAO and to be accessible on a routine basis to the staff who handle FAO matters than are officials at the highest levels of the other major agencies involved.

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[87] Waters, op. cit., p. 68.
[88] Ibid., p. 69.
[89] Parker, op. cit., p. 126.

Mr. Lewis of the State Department told the Select Committee on March 5: "I intend to ask my colleagues who have appeared here today to join me in a close look at whether our interagency consultations can be improved, and whether any modifications in operating procedures are advisable." [90]

ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING POLICY

The staff recommends that the administration immediately undertake a review of the way in which U.S. policy toward FAO is made and implemented. This review should have as its objectives the clarification of lines of responsibility for making and implementing policy, the reorganization of the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee and a redefinition of the committee's "terms of reference," and the allocation of sufficient budgetary resources to assure that United States participation in the organization is not constrained by staffing and operating standards developed in a different era. It is important that this review reflect FAO's changing role in the food policy subsystem and the importance which the U.S. Government attaches to the organization as a part of this subsystem.

The administration should consider the following methods of restructuring and reinvigorating the way in which U.S. policy toward FAO is made.

1. Retain the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee, but shift leadership to either the Bureau of International Organization Affairs or the Agency for International Development. This option would make sense if at the same time the Murphy Commission's recommendations for assigning responsibility for multilateral diplomacy to four new functional bureaus reporting directly to an Under Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs were implemented.

A shift to AID should be contemplated if the official view of the United States is that FAO is primarily a development rather than a "collegiate" agency. On the other hand, the development or field activities of FAO are by and large outside of the control of the organization's governing bodies. Recognizing that United States participation in FAO is largely participation in the governing bodies and their committees whose concern is the regular program, it seems more appropriate for either the Department of Agriculture or the Department of State to have the leading position.

2. Retain the FAO Interagency Committee structure and USDA's leadership, but expand and upgrade the office of International Organization Affairs within the Department. Staff from the Department of State, AID, and other agencies concerned with FAO might serve in the office for periods of time or, alternatively, USDA personnel might serve in these agencies prior to assuming a permanent position in the office. The office might be removed from the Foreign Agricultural Service and be made a part of the Office of the Secretary. The Director would have the rank of an Assistant Secretary. Alternatively, the Office could become a staff arm of the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs and be headed by a deputy assistant secretary.

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[90] Lewis, op. cit., p. 122.

3. Restructure the Interagency Committee so that senior officials responsible for international food policy and nongovernmental advisers regularly participate in its activities. This might be done by establishing permanent subcommittees or working groups to be chaired by senior officials from relevant agencies and co-chaired by a nongovernment official. Another way of assuring high level participation might be to assign the chairmanship of the committee to a senior member of the White House staff.

4. Retain the basic interagency structure but make the committee a subcommittee or working group of the recently-created Agriculture Policy Committee. All responsibility for U.S. policy toward FAO could be transferred to this committee or its working group.

A NATIONAL FOOD AND NUTRITION POLICY

The absence of a coherent policymaking organization for overall food and agriculture policy may explain why the United States lacks an overall food policy as well as a foreign food and nutrition policy. "Good organization does not insure successful policy," the Murphy Commission stated, "nor does poor organization preclude it. But steadily and powerfully, organizational patterns influence the effectiveness of government." [91]

All officials who have contact with FAO should be speaking with one voice and all officials involved in world agriculture, economics and trade, development assistance, and foreign policy should also be speaking with one voice. Martin McLaughlin of the Overseas Development Council illustrated this point in his March 4 testimony:

> The fact of the matter is that the United States sends delegates to multinational trade negotiations in Geneva and Tokyo, to bilateral grain negotiations in Moscow, to the Conference in International Economic Cooperation in Paris, to UNCTAD in Nairobi, to the International Wheat Council in London, and to various FAO Conferences, Council meetings, and colloquies in Rome—all of which are concerned in some measure with food policy issues; and there is no clear, consistent, coherent policy to which all can refer or in which they can feel they are in concert.[92]

To prepare a food policy is to bring together organizationally all agencies of government that might have an interest in the subject. E. A. Jaenke and Associates told the Office of Technology Assessment that "it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to indicate each and every organization, department, bureau, agency, council, board, and committee that has by law or executive order been given some significant responsibility for at least one aspect relating to food." [93] Jaenke and Associates estimated that 26 "major agencies, departments, or governmental bodies" are involved, including the Department of Agriculture which alone has 23 separate agencies with an interest.[94] Other authorities and observers come up with different estimates: Ralston-Purina's Paul Cornelsen in his statement prepared for the hearing of March 4 said he counted at least 10 agencies in the executive branch "who had a hand in some aspect of our efforts to improve

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[91] Report of the "Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy." Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1975, p. 1.
[92] McLaughlin, op. cit., p. 52.
[93] E. A. Jaenke and Associates, Inc., "A National Food Policy: Requirements and Alternatives." A Paper prepared for the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Dec. 10, 1975, p. 22.
[94] Ibid., p. 23.

food policy and nutrition in the Third World." [95] The Library of Congress estimated that 33 departments or agencies had an interest in food policy.

Because food policy is an aspect of the work of many agencies and because, as Raymond Hopkins said in a background paper for the Murphy Commission, "(f)ood has become a global issue with dozens of related policies linking hundreds of organizations" and in which our "policy on food links our domestic with our foreign policies, our foreign policies with each other, and our foreign policies and those of other states," it must be dealt within an interagency framework.[96] According to Jaenke and Associates, any food policy that does exist today is made in an interagency framework.

> As each crisis emerged in recent years, a new short-range patchwork decision-making procedure was quickly inaugurated, generally at the White House level. The effect has been to give to others rather than the Secretary of Agriculture greater and greater responsibility for food policy-making. In addition, it has resulted in an almost unbelieveable number of councils, boards, agencies, and committees—many overlapping and duplicating, but all designed to pull together the necessary information for high-level decision-making.[97]

In testimony last January before the Senate Agriculture Committee, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Charles W. Robinson, cited the increasing importance of agricultural policy to our overall foreign policy as the impetus for the recent creation of three coordinating bodies:

> The Food Committee of the Economic Policy Board/National Security Council. Membership includes the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Labor and Commerce; the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs; the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy; and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Its mandate was to develop and maintain data on grain production and exports.
>
> The Food Deputies Group of the Economic Policy Board. Representatives of all domestic and foreign agencies with a substantial interest in food policy met weekly.
>
> The International Food Review Group. This body was chaired by the Secretary of State with the Secretary of Agriculture as vice chairman. The IFRG and its working group at the Assistant Secretary level were established to coordinate U.S. followup activities to the World Food Conference.[98]

This is all that the Under Secretary said about making foreign food policy. This out-of-date material is included to point out that no mention was made of the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee. This is an indication of the low importance which senior officials attach to FAO, a finding which again belies the statement that the United States considers FAO to be the paramount agency in the international food field.

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[95] Cornelsen, op. cit., p. 8.
[96] Hopkins, op. cit., p. 44.
[97] E. A. Jaenke and Associates, op. cit.
[98] Testimony of the Honorable Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, "Who's Making Foreign Agricultural Policy," Hearings of the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Washington, D.C., Jan. 22 and 23, 1976, pp. 28–30.

The U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee does not relate to or interact with other food policy coordinating groups. According to Assistant Secretary Bell, no direct relationship existed between the FAO Interagency Committee and the International Food Review Group which was charged with coordinating U.S. followup activities to the World Food Conference, despite the fact FAO was responsible for implementing many of the World Food Conference resolutions. Mr. Bell explained the situation in these words:

> The World Food Conference was organized by the United Nations rather than by FAO. The World Food Council, proposed by the World Food Conference, is also a UN rather than an FAO body. Consequently, the IFRG was set up by the Department of State and is chaired by an officer of that Department. Also, it has dealt with a much narrower range of subjects than the U.S.-FAO Interagency Committee, and has concentrated primarily on the question of grain reserves. However, the results of the deliberations of the IFRG have been taken into account in the drafting of position papers for FAO meetings * * *[99]

On March 5, 1976, a new mechanism was introduced to replace the three coordinating bodies named above. President Ford named Earl Butz, Secretary of Agriculture, as the Chairman of the Agriculture Policy Committee. The Committee replaces the IFRG and the EPB/NSC Food Committee. The Food Deputies Group has been transformed into the Agriculture Policy Working Group and will provide staff assistance to the Committee.

According to a memorandum from the President to the members of the committee, "This new committee consolidates agricultural policy-making into one group, which will advise me on the formulation, coordination, and implementation of all food and agricultural policy. The scope of the Committee includes both domestic and international food and agricultural issues."[100]

The members of the new committee are: Secretaries of Agriculture, State, Treasury, Commerce; Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Director of the Office of Management and Budget; Assistants to the President for Domestic Affairs, Economic Affairs, and National Security Affairs; Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs, and Acting Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy. Officials who were members of one of the defunct groups but who do not serve on the new committee are the Secretary of Labor and the Deputy Secretary of State.

The new committee has the potential to become the focal point for devising and implementing a national food and nutrition policy. This body could also coordinate all U.S. activity in the food field, including U.S. participation in various international food organizatons. The absence of any mention of FAO in the documents thus far made public about the committee suggest that FAO and the Interagency Committee will not be considered by the committee in its work.

According to published reports, the committee plans to meet "at least every other month," to leave "operational matters" which had been subjects of dispute under the old system to the Department of Agriculture, and to discuss such matters as multilateral loans for palm oil development, international sugar agreements, meat imports and quotas,

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[99] Letter from Assistant Secretary Bell to Senator Percy, Dec. 11, 1975.
[100] White House Press Release, Mar. 11, 1976.

and ways to expedite food aid decisions.[101] These are matters of importance, but they seem minor in comparison to the need for the United States to develop a coherent world food policy as part of a national food and nutrition policy.

ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR FOOD POLICYMAKING [102]

Responsibility for a national food and nutrition policy and for its international components might be assigned to an existing department or agency, to an interagency body such as the Agriculture Policy Committee, to a unit in the Executive Office of the President headed by a presidential assistant, or to a newly created independent agency, a unit of the Executive Office of the President, or a Cabinet-level department.

Assigning responsibility and authority to an existing department or agency would have the value of simplicity. The present division of responsibility among a score or more of agencies, each with its own interests and constituencies to support and defend, would make it extremely difficult for any one of these units to succeed in bringing all the pieces together in a national policy.

An interagency framework for food and nutrition policymaking now exists. This framework, which recognizes the legitimate interest and expertise of several units of the executive branch could produce such a policy. It avoids establishing a new bureaucracy in the executive branch and makes the existing structures work better through a process of interagency consultation and bargaining. The question is whether the political will to develop a comprehensive food and nutrition policy exists. The interagency structure can work only if the President wants it to work and only if the officials involved are personally committed to the process.

An alternative to an interagency body chaired by a Cabinet member is one chaired by a member of the White House staff. This person could be designated an assistant to the President for food policy and could be supported by a small staff in the White House. Jaenke and associates suggest that this interagency body be called the National Food Council. The structure could be established by executive order and would assure attention to food policy at the highest levels of the White House.

The chairman of the Council, on the other hand, would have no operating authority or responsibility and could only make recommendations about policy. He or she would have to rely on others to sanction officially the national policy, and to implement the recommendations devised by the Council. Not too much is to be gained by locating the Council in the White House if the objective of developing and implementing a comprehensive policy has the full backing and support of the President.

Jaenke and Associates also pose two alternatives which involve creating new agencies for food and nutrition policy. In one instance, a Cabinet-level Food Administrator would head an independent agency within the executive branch staffed by technical experts in all aspects of food policy. Working with a committee of Cabinet officials similar

[101] Journal of Commerce, Apr. 9, 1976, p. 5.
[102] The following section draws heavily on the paper prepared by E. A. Jaenke and Associates for the Office of Technology Assessment, pp. 30–39.

to the Food Council, the Administrator would devise a food policy, but it would be implemented through the existing departments.

The advantage of this alternative is that the head of the agency would be specifically empowered to devise a food policy and he or she would have the necessary full-time staff to accomplish the objective. The Food Administrator would have more authority than a Presidential assistant who could only make recommendations to the President or other officials.

Another alternative is a reorganization of the Federal Government to create a new Cabinet-level Department of Food and Nutrition. This would have the advantage of locating in one spot all authority and responsibility for making and implementing food policy. A good organization, however, does not assure a food policy. A reorganization of this magnitude, touching as many as 33 existing units in the executive branch, would be disruptive. It would arouse opposition inside of Government and out. In its international aspects the work of this Department would still have to be coordinated with that of the Department of State.

Senator George McGovern, Chairman of the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, and Senator Mark Hatfield, a member of the committee, have both submitted legislative proposals which seek to establish a focal point for food policy in the executive branch.

Senator Hatfield's bill—S. 881—establishes for a period of 4 years an Office of Food Administration in the Executive Office of the President. The Administrator of the Office is to advise the President and the Congress about all domestic and foreign food assistance programs and to recommend a national nutrition policy to the President. He is not given any operating responsibilities, but must instead work with the existing agencies charged with this authority.

Senator McGovern, together with Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, also a member of the Select Committee, have introduced the Federal Nutrition Planning and Organization Act S. 2867. The bill renames the Department of Agriculture the Department of Food, Agriculture, and Rural Affairs. It also creates an Office of Food and Nutrition in the Executive Office of the President. The Director of the Office is to advise and assist the President, the Congress, and the agencies of the executive branch in formulating, implementing, and evaluating policies relating to or having an impact on food production and consumption and the nutritional status of people at home and abroad. The Director will facilitate interagency communication and consultation on matters related to food and nutrition, but operating responsibility remains with existing agencies or departments. He is charged with preparing annually a National Food and Nutrition report which relates nutritional needs here and overseas to the operations of U.S. domestic and international food assistance programs and to make necessary recommendations to the Congress. The Office will also devise and implement a system for monitoring and assessing the nutritional status of the population of the United States and of the world.

The staff recommends that the relevant congressional committees give immediate consideration to the alternative proposals for establishing within the executive branch a focal point for devising and implementing a national food and nutrition policy which includes a significant international food policy component and a strategy for combating worldwide hunger and malnutrition.

APPENDIX

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN FAO

Our general objectives in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) support broad U.S. foreign policy considerations, and stress importance of international agriculture for the United States. Within this country's overall foreign policy framework, the following objectives guide U.S. participation in FAO:

(i) Stimulating global economic development;

(ii) Increasing national agricultural outputs through the effective international exchange of scientific and technological information;

(iii) Improving the quality and availability of global agricultural commodity information, as a basis for planning production and facilitating international trade in agricultural products; and

(iv) Facilitating this country's dynamic participation in international agricultural markets.

FAO was brought formally into existence in Quebec on October 16, 1945. The President of the United States convened the Hot Springs Conference which, in 1943, developed the basic ideas and plans that led to the creation of the Organization. The United States took a leading part in the promulgation of FAO's purposes, and has had a leading role in the interpretation and amplification of those purposes over the years since the Quebec Conference.

Our objectives as described briefly above are consistent with the purposes of FAO, as set out in the preamble of the FAO constitution:

(i) Raising levels of nutrition and standards of living of the people under the member governments respective jurisdictions;

(ii) Securing improvements in the efficiency of the production and distribution of all food and agricultural products;

(iii) Bettering the condition of rural populations; and

(iv) Thus contributing toward an expanding world economy and ensuring humanity's freedom from hunger.

FAO's purposes are achieved through many types of activities, but these may be grouped into three broad categories;

(i) The collection, analysis, and dissemination of data and other information relating to food and agriculture:

(ii) The provision of international forums for the consideration of problems of common concern to the member countries of the Organization, on either regional or worldwide bases; and

(iii) The provision of technical assistance to developing countries in the planning and implementation of national or regional development projects and programs.

Among FAO's functions, as defined in its constitution, is the furnishing of such technical assistance as governments may request. At the outset, attention to this function was minimal. However, from 1950 onward, as many new countries emerged in the developing areas of the world, and as development funds became available, FAO responded rapidly to the need and, throughout the last two decades a large proportion of its total resources has been devoted to the development aspects of its program of work.

Since FAO is a primary multilateral source of advice and technical assistance to the developing countries in the broad area of agricultural development planning and programs, substantive competence and administrative capacity to plan and manage its extensive advisory services and technical assistance to the developing countries are essential. This development assistance element is discussed further in the following comments on individual sectors of FAO responsibility.

The United States has a profound interest in these activities as evidenced by its own large bilateral aid programs, its substantial contributions to the multilateral development agencies and to the interrelated elements of agricultural production, rural development and reduction of poverty. Thus, the United States has a special interest in close interaction between its own efforts in these areas and those of FAO.

Specific Objectives

AGRICULTURE

By far the largest portion of the increasing amounts of food required by an ever-expanding population must be produced in the countries where that food is consumed. It follows that a major objective must be the expansion of economic agricultural production, particularly in the developing, heavily populated countries.

Other major objectives must be to conserve and use effectively the planet's limited soil, water, plant, and animal resources, both in the relatively short term and over the longer term.

Within these broad guidelines, the United States considers it important that FAO concentrate on those areas which can improve man's present and future welfare. FAO is in an excellent position to take effective action or to assist member countries in taking effective action in such important areas is:

(i) Identification, evaluation, preservation and effective use of important animal and plant genetic resources;

(ii) Development of efficient national seed industries;

(iii) Reduction of postharvest crop losses;

(iv) Establishment of effective animal and plant quarantine regulations and procedures;

(v) Development of safe and effective plant and animal pest and disease control and eradication techniques;

(vi) Development of economical, effective water storage and irrigation systems; including adequate measures to control soil erosion, and to conserve water through the control of runoff;

(vii) Development of balanced labor-intensive farming systems for small holders; and

(viii) Development of onfarm and other rural processing of agricultural products, and more efficient marketing systems for farm products.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

FAO should be concerned with the economic aspects of agriculture and with the social benefits that can accrue from greater and more efficient production. Specifically, U.S. objectives for effective action by FAO center in four major areas:

(i) Collection and dissemination of essential statistical and economic data on agricultural, fishery, and forestry production, distribution, and utilization;

(ii) Analyzing these data, and providing guidance to member countries, including the making of long-term projections;

(iii) Providing advisory assistance, particularly to developing countries, with a view to improving their capabilities to collect and disseminate statistics, conduct economic analyses, and do effective economic policy planning in the agricultural, fisheries, and forestry fields;

(iv) Providing information, guidance, and advisory or technical assistance to member countries on the development and strengthening of the rural institutions essential to the achievement of agricultural, fishery, and forestry development, and the betterment of rural living conditions. Such institutions relate to both the technical and economic and social aspects.

FAO is in a particularly good position to collect, tabulate and publish statistical information, on a worldwide basis, for all major aspects of agricultural, fishery, and forestry production, distribution and utilization. While it is in a position to do useful economic analytical and projection work, such work should be kept in proper balance in relation to technical activities aimed at improving production, conservation, distribution, and utilization.

COMMODITIES

Although FAO's activities relating to commodities are a part of the Organization's overall economic activities, those activities which relate to the major agricultural commodities, and particularly to those portions which move in international trade, are of special importance.

The U.S. objectives in regard to FAO's agricultural commodity activities relate primarily to the following areas in which the Organization is in position to render effective service to its member countres:

(i) The collection and exchange of data and other information on current production, consumption, and trade;

(ii) The analyses of commodity data and the consideration of problems to which they relate, in the Committee on Commodity Problems (CCP) and its subsidiary bodies, i.e., the various intergovernmental groups, and the Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal; and

(iii) The judicious assessment of prevailing food stocks and requirements.

In its work to achieve these objectives, the United States has traditionally supported the general discussion and study of agricultural trade matters in the CCP and other appropriate FAO forums. On the other hand, FAO has no implementing authority in this area, and the United States believes specific trade matters should be dealt with in the appropriate negotiating fora, for example, GATT.

The United States considers it important that, with the formation of new bodies, CCP and its subsidiary groups should maintain their traditional roles, which may include the monitoring of progress in international agricultural adjustment. As a corollary, the new bodies (such as the Committee on World Food Security) should take into account the work of the CCP and its subsidiary groups, and to the extent possible should rely on existing FAO staff and supporting services.

FISHERIES

Marine and inland fish comprise an important protein source. The nature of this resource is such that an extraordinary degree of regional and international cooperation and coordination is required to insure its continuing availability, and to avoid decreases, sometimes irretrievable, in fish production. FAO is uniquely qualified to provide this needed global approach that will be all the more necessary under the new ocean regime that is expected to emerge from current Law of the Sea negotiations.

Specifically, U.S. objectives are:

(i) Achievement of proper management of world fish stocks through regional and international cooperation;

(ii) Contributing to and benefiting from the collection, analyses, and dissemination of data basic to sound fishery conservation and utilization;

(iii) Extending and coordinating effective technical assistance to developing countries, through national and regional projects, and including major attention to projects that maximize benefits to low income, small-scale fishermen and fish culturists. In this connection, the United States believes that management and development should be pursued in a complementary manner and that technical assistance should be appropriately proportioned among all stages and types of fishery development, including stock assessment, harvesting, culture, processing, and marketing;

(iv) Utilization of the FAO regional fishery bodies to promote and facilitate the adoption of cooperative management approaches, and to enhance development processes by providing more accurate assessments of local needs and suggesting more productive application of available resources to regional development projects; and

(v) Utilization of the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI), as the only truly global forum for discussion of fishery problems, for provision of the informed overview and guidance necessary to optimize FAO fishery efforts.

FORESTRY

As with food, demands for timber and other forest products continue to expand as the human population increases. As that population increases, it places increased pressure upon the finite portions of

the Earth's surface which can be devoted to forests. Managing the world's forests in such a manner as to insure maximum continuing output is, therefore, essential to man's welfare. The United States considers that FAO can make an important contribution to the achievement of this overall objective. Specific areas in which FAO's participation and assistance can be most beneficial include the following:

(i) Development of tropical forestry, thus making substantially greater use of the world's largest underused and least effectively managed forest resource;

(ii) Development of pulp and paper industries, in appropriate places, to insure effective use of available forest resources;

(iii) Fostering development of forestry activities and processing of forest products in areas and in ways whereby they can contribute effectively to rural development; and to meeting world needs for forest products.

The United States considers FAO's work on forestry statistics to be especially helpful. Regarding research, it is the U.S. view that FAO's emphasis should be on the strengthening of national forestry research institutions.

NUTRITION

To help raise levels of nutrition for all peoples in all countries, and to improve the quality of food products, the United States, through its participation in FAO seeks:

(i) To facilitate the exchange of information on nutrition;

(ii) To promote coordination among approaches and activities of various international organizations and among national and private organizations that are in position to contribute to the objective of raising levels of nutrition;

(iii) To achieve sustained improvement in nutritional levels in member countries, and particularly in the developing countries; and

(iv) To support the development and application of international food standards.

In order to achieve these objectives, it is the view of the United States that:

(i) FAO's nutrition activities should give attention to the scientific, technical, and planning aspects, and that there should be a reasonable balance among these sectors;

(ii) FAO should assist countries in developing their own capacities to analyze problems, and to plan, implement, and evaluate nutrition programs;

(iii) FAO, in cooperation with other organizations should encourage and—where practicable—coordinate the conduct of applied nutrition research;

(iv) FAO should also cooperate with other organizations, as appropriate, in continued efforts to develop an early warning system for predicting serious nutritional problems; and

(v) FAO should continue to cooperate with WHO, and with member countries that chair Codex Committees, of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, with a view to moving forward expeditiously in the establishment of Codex standards.

FAO should identify in cooperation with other donor organizations and agencies, geographic and substantive areas of greatest need, and

identify areas wherein various organizations and agencies might concentrate, thus avoiding duplication and insuring effective use of available resources.

The United States is of the view that adequate nutrition can most effectively be achieved through diets that include an appropriate variety of foods. However, where specific deficiencies need to be addressed and where economic, social, or health conditions make the use of a varied diet difficult or not feasible, use of fortified or fabricated foods, or single foods rich in specific nutrients may often be a useful and practical strategy.

ROLE OF WOMEN IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

The United States sees as a primary consideration the need to utilize effectively all human resources in rural development programs and the obligation to improve the status and welfare of women. The United States believes that FAO could and should play a decisive role in (*a*) giving full weight to the contributions that women make in the total rural development effort; (*b*) insuring their participation in the shaping of development policies and programs in the agricultural section; (*c*) developing effective training and information programs for both home-based and out-of home activities of women; and (*d*) appropriate institution building. FAO should monitor programs in which it is involved to insure that these impact favorably on women as participants and beneficiaries.

RURAL HOME AND FAMILY DEVELOPMENT

Essential to rural development are: (*a*) The improvement of nutrition through improved planning and preparation of family meals; (*b*) improved efficiency in household production, conservation, and storage of many foods and other products; (*c*) the improvement of household management and technology and conditions of rural living; (*d*) the acceptance and implementation of family planning programs and (*e*) the fuller participation of the rural family in the development process.

The United States believes FAO should have a strong home economics program to deal with the development and application of scientific and technical knowledge in these areas, make efficient use of this knowledge in the related nutrition and rural development programs, and encourage countries to utilize this knowledge more fully.

DEVELOPMENT

The provision of technical assistance is a major function of FAO. The United States' interest and effort in this area is of such a magnitude that this function is deserving of special emphasis. The United States has supported and encouraged FAO's technical assistance, and more broadly, its development activities as they have increased over the last 25 years. The United States believes that:

(i) Major attention should be directed to increasing food production, and improvement of nutritional levels, in all the developing countries;

(ii) Special attention should be given to increasing the efficiency and outputs of small farms, and to increasing the participation of poor farmers in development:

(iii) Major attention should also be given to the essential activities that must accompany increases in production, that is, reduction of postharvest losses, adequate storage, preservation and processing, effective marketing systems, and increased supply of inputs; and

(iv) The achievement of the foregoing objectives, while important in the short term, are essentially long-term goals, and their achievement will require particular emphasis upon the institution building and infrastructure that is necessary for such long-term but relatively rapid growth. That is, (*a*) expansion of national agricultural research systems and further strengthening of international research institutions; (*b*) rapid development and growth of a wide range of institutions including extension, marketing, credit, and input supply; (*c*) accelerated expansion of educational institutions to provide the large numbers of trained personnel needed; (*d*) large investment in the physical capital of rural development including roads, electrification, irrigation, and market towns; (*e*) special emphasis throughout on including the small farmer and the rural landless, in the various development processes; and (*f*) special concern for the role women do and can play at all levels with respect to the policy determination, administration, and implementation of programs for the production and utilization of food.

CONCLUSION

In the light of the general and specific objectives set out above, it is the intention of the United States to make full use of FAO as an instrument for progress in world agricultural, fishery, and forestry matters. In so doing the United States will:

(i) Contribute to, and effectively utilize the services FAO provides, as an international center for statistical and many other kinds of economic and scientific and technical information;

(ii) Utilize the wide variety of mechanisms FAO provides for consultations and cooperation among countries;

(iii) Support and benefit from the effective mechanisms FAO provides for assistance to developing countries; and

(iv) Support and benefit from the constructive leadership FAO is in position to provide in international agricultural, fishery and forestry affairs, given the status the Organization has achieved in these fields.

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